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Researchers have found that higher education is known to stabilize political opinions and 
thought to enhance critical thinking skills. The role that an individual’s level of education 
plays in shaping public opinion during a foreign affairs crisis, within the context of 
repetitious and uniform news media coverage, has yet to be determined. The theoretical 
foundation of agenda-setting explains how salience is created by emphasizing certain 
messages and influencing public opinion and may bypass education and political 
knowledge. The purpose of this quantitative study was to examine the relationship 
between education level and public opinion immediately before the Iraq War. The 
analysis used a secondary dataset consisting of 3,262 respondents in a 2002 national 
public opinion survey. Binomial logistic regression was used to test 5 hypotheses. 
Findings indicated there was a significant relationship between education levels and 
support for combatting international terrorism as a foreign policy goal as well as the use 
of troops to invade Iraq (p < .006). The results indicated that in some instances higher 
education played a significant role in shaping public opinion during the period before the 
Iraq War. Positive social change from this research includes helping policy-makers 
understand how public opinion is shaped during a crisis so the views of the citizenry can 
be more effectively incorporated into the policy-making process.  
 




MLS, Indiana University South Bend, 2007 
BFA, Indiana University South Bend, 2002 
 
 
Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 






I dedicate this body of research to the remarkable women in my life. My wife, 
Michelle, who has helped shape the man I have become. She has challenged me to not 
only obtain new skills and pursue my dreams, she has been instrumental in helping me 
accomplish anything I set my mind upon. To my daughters, Katanna and Satori - may 
you continue to seek out knowledge, never stop improving yourselves and leave the 
world a better place. But most importantly, Gnothi Seauton, always and forever. If you do 
this, the rest will fall into place, effortlessly. 
Acknowledgments 
This dissertation would not have been possible without the expertise, and 
guidance of Dr. Karen Shafer. I am forever grateful for your help in completing this body 
of work. You were instrumental in making me a better writer and researcher. I would like 
to acknowledge Dr. David Powell for his patience and support, as well as Dr. Tanya 
Settles for her bringing it all together. Your serving on my committee and kind words 
meant a great deal, especially in the end.   
It is also necessary to express my eternal gratitude toward my wife, Michelle 
Steele. I could not have accomplished this monumental task without her words of 
encouragement, love, and patience, through all the late nights and sacrifices along the 
way. My daughters, Katanna and Satori, also for their love, patience, and understanding 
while I pursued this dream. I would not be the person I am without you all, and this 
would not have been possible without all your support. 
 
i 
Table of Contents 
List of Tables ..................................................................................................................... iv 
Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study ....................................................................................1 
Introduction ....................................................................................................................1 
Problem Statement .........................................................................................................3 
Purpose of the Study ......................................................................................................3 
Research Question and Hypotheses ...............................................................................3 
Theoretical Foundation ..................................................................................................5 
Nature of the Study ........................................................................................................6 
Definitions......................................................................................................................7 
Assumptions ...................................................................................................................8 




Chapter 2: Literature Review .............................................................................................17 
Introduction ..................................................................................................................17 
Literature Search Strategy............................................................................................19 
Theoretical Foundation ................................................................................................20 
Public Opinion and News Media Influence .................................................................23 
The Role of Education .................................................................................................30 
The Impact of Repetitive Messages .............................................................................34 
 
ii 
Factors Beyond Education that Shape Public Opinion ................................................38 
Summary and Conclusion ............................................................................................42 
Chapter 3: Research Method ..............................................................................................45 
Introduction ..................................................................................................................45 
Research Design and Rationale ...................................................................................45 
Methodology ................................................................................................................47 
Operationalization of Variables ............................................................................ 49 
Independent Variable ............................................................................................ 49 
Dependent Variables ............................................................................................. 49 
Covariates ............................................................................................................. 50 
Data Analysis Plan ................................................................................................ 52 
Threats to Validity .......................................................................................................55 
Ethical Procedures ................................................................................................ 57 
Summary ......................................................................................................................58 
Chapter 4: Results ..............................................................................................................60 
Introduction ..................................................................................................................60 
Data ..........................................................................................................................60 
Descriptive Statistics ....................................................................................................60 
Assumption Testing .....................................................................................................63 
Results ..........................................................................................................................64 
Summary ......................................................................................................................71 




Interpretation of the Findings.......................................................................................74 





Appendix A: Operational Definitions Full Text from the original Survey used by 




List of Tables 
Table 1. Values and Categories of Variables …………………………………………….52 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics – All Variables…………………………………………..62 
Table 3. Favoring or opposing economic sanctions against Iraq ………………………...66 
Table 4. Opinions rating combating international terrorism as a United States foreign 
policy goal…………………………………..……………………..……………..67 
Table 5. Opinions regarding if Iraq will develop weapons of mass destruction………....68 
Table 6. Opinions of favoring or opposing the use of U.S. troops if Iraq invaded Saudi 
Arabia…………………………………………………………………………….70 








Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
Introduction 
Agenda-setting occurs when a topic in the media is brought to the forefront of 
public awareness and influences public opinion (McCombs, 2004/2014; McCombs & 
Shaw, 1972). Agenda-setting can change public opinion. Individuals rarely take the 
opportunity to fact-check, and therefore may not know if the information provided has 
been misrepresented (Unkelbach, Bayer, Alves, Kich, & Stahl, 2011). The difficulty of 
fact-checking the enormous number of news media messages leads to information being 
consumed as presented without consideration of counter or dissenting arguments. 
Because context is necessary for a fuller understanding of historical events as they relate 
to a crisis or international dispute, the average citizen must rely on subject matter experts 
to frame arguments and detail facts, usually accomplished through the news media. 
Those with higher levels of education have more stabilized political opinions 
compared to their less educated counterparts (Converse, 1964/2006; Zaller, 1991). 
Politics and their consequences are followed more closely by the educated than the less 
educated (Campbell, 2013). Johansen and Joslyn (2008) cited education as a resource to 
combat political propaganda but found it is not as effective when uncompetitive 
messaging exists. Higher formal education can influence the formation of public opinion.  
Increased news media coverage concentrating on the topic of war then propagates 
agenda-setting (Rampton & Stauber, 2003). As the news media cover stories with 
increased repetition, their target audience is exposed to specific information designed to 
leave a lasting memory. Repeating information reinforces memory, improves recall, and 
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influences action (Brown & Nix, 1996; Dubuisson, Fiori, & Nicolas, 2012; Lakoff, 2006; 
Rampton & Stauber, 2003; Saville, 2011; Schreiber et al., 2013). Repetition of a 
message, even if the information is false, can promote belief in an idea (Rampton & 
Stauber, 2003). Message repetition may contribute to lessening the influence of education 
on the formation of public opinion. Zaller’s (1992) research indicated that individuals 
answer questions “off the top of the head,” relying on the information to which they have 
access at any given moment (p. 38). If Zaller (1992) is correct, and news media 
messaging is ubiquitous and repetitious in nature, an individual may only have access to a 
limited perspective.  
News media coverage sets agendas through increasing the salience of the 
message, which in turn shapes public opinion. Salience is determined by repetition, by 
which a message garners more attention and credibility and becomes stored in long-term 
memory (McCombs, 2004/2014). Repeated information reinforces memory, improving 
recall and influencing action (Brown & Nix, 1996; Dubuisson, et al., 2012; Lakoff, 2006; 
Rampton & Stauber, 2003; Saville, 2011; Schreiber et al., 2013). The greater the salience, 
the greater its impact on public opinion (McCombs, 2004/2014). Whether education 
creates a barrier or an opening to changing public opinion is not understood fully. There 
is a gap in the literature regarding if and how education levels impact the way in which 
public opinion is shaped during a crisis. The findings of my research close the gap by 
determining if education levels have an impact on public opinion during a foreign affairs 




The role education levels play in shaping public opinion during a foreign affairs 
crisis within the context of repetitious and uniform news media coverage has not been 
determined. While agenda-setting is well-studied in political communication (Jenkins & 
Monroe, 2012; Johansen & Joslyn, 2008; McCombs, 2004/2014; Minor, 2013; O’Neal, 
2011; Steuter & Wills, 2008), there has been little, if any, research conducted linking 
agenda-setting, education, and repetition during a foreign affairs crisis. To understand the 
complexities and effects of agenda-setting further, I conducted a quantitative study to 
determine if education levels affect public opinion during periods of crisis, specifically 
the period leading up to the Iraq War.  
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of the quantitative study was to determine if there is a relationship 
between education level attainment and public opinion before the Iraq War started. The 
independent variable was education level. I used ideology, sex, race, income level, and 
political party as covariates, which were expected to influence the dependent variables. 
The dependent variables were: favoring economic sanctions against Iraq, combating 
international terrorism as a foreign policy goal, Iraq developing weapons of mass 
destruction in the next 10 years, favor or oppose the use of U.S. troops if Iraq invaded 
Saudi Arabia, and, support for the United States using troops to invade Iraq and 
overthrow the government of Saddam Hussein. 
Research Question and Hypotheses 
The following research question guided this study.  
4 
 
Research Question  
What is the relationship between education levels and public opinion on foreign 
policy issues covered extensively by the news media during periods of crisis such as 
before the Iraq War?  
I formulated the following five hypotheses to help answer this research question 
by examining various aspects of public opinion before the Iraq War. 
H01A. There is no significant difference in public opinion opposing economic 
sanctions on Iraq by the United States based on education levels. 
Ha1A. There is a significant difference in public opinion opposing economic 
sanctions on Iraq by the United States based on education levels. 
H01B. There is no significant difference in public opinion rating combating 
international terrorism as a United States foreign policy goal based on education levels. 
Ha1B. There is a significant difference public opinion rating combating 
international terrorism as a United States foreign policy goal based on education levels. 
H01C. There is no significant difference in public opinion regarding if Iraq will 
develop weapons of mass destruction based on education levels. 
Ha1C. There is a significant difference in public opinion regarding if Iraq will 
develop weapons of mass destruction based on education levels. 
H01D. There is no significant difference in public opinion of favoring or opposing 
the use of U.S. troops if Iraq invaded Saudi Arabia based on education levels.  
Ha1D. There is a significant difference in public opinion on favoring or opposing 
the use of U.S. troops if Iraq invaded Saudi Arabia based on education levels. 
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H01E. There is no significant difference in public opinion on using U.S. troops to 
invade and overthrow the government of Saddam Hussein/Iraq based on education levels.  
Ha1E. There is a significant difference in public opinion on using United States 
troops to invade and overthrow Saddam Hussein/Iraq based on education levels. 
Theoretical Foundation 
Agenda-setting theory was the foundation for this study. Agenda-setting is created 
when the salience of topic is high, or prominent at a given moment (McCombs & Shaw, 
1972). Journalists, unwitting or not, set the focus of public attention on topics and stories, 
which change perceptions of specific issues, thus changing public opinion (McCombs, 
2004/2014). While agenda-setting can be used for a wide array of applications, it is best 
known for its use in understanding how public opinion is shaped. 
McCombs (2004/2014) illustrated the central assertion of agenda-setting: transfer 
of issue to the salience of the message from the news media agenda to the public agenda. 
As news coverage becomes patterned, the public transfers the issue from prominence to 
importance (McCombs, 2004/2014). News media shape public opinion (Baum & Potter, 
2008), which then shapes public policy. Agenda-setting is the critical link between the 
news media and the formation of public opinion. The shaping of public opinion through 
agenda-setting by the news media has created patterns that have been studied by social 
scientists for nearly five decades. Further examples of use, relevance, and explanation of 
agenda-setting theory follow in Chapter 2.  
My research question examined the role of education levels in shaping public 
opinion during periods of crisis with repetitious and uniform news media coverage. The 
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theory of agenda-setting was appropriate for this study as it is designed to help explain 
how the news media influence public opinion and has been extensively used in previous 
research on political messaging (Berganza & Martin, 1997; McCombs, 2004/2014; 
McCombs & Shaw, 1972; Sanchez-Aranda et al., 1997). The role of education as a 
stabilizing mechanism of political opinion is relevant, as those same periods of high-
messaging are often in conjunction with turbulent affairs, and as a result, politics 
(Converse, 1964/2006). Because the assumptions of news media and reaction were 
present, agenda-setting was an appropriate theoretical framework to address the research 
question. 
Nature of the Study 
In this quantitative study, I used secondary data analysis to examine the role that 
education levels played in shaping public opinion on public policy during periods of 
crisis. I obtained the data set from Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social 
Research (Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, [ICPSR]). Study Number 3673, 
American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy (Chicago Council on Foreign 
Relations, 2002) involves a public opinion survey of 3,262 adults 18 years or older living 
in the United States. Surveys were conducted June 1–30, 2002, via telephone and 
personal interviews by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and The German 
Marshall Fund of the United States.  
I chose a quantitative approach because it can determine if there were statistical 
correlations between the concepts of agenda-setting, education level, and public opinion, 
especially during times of war and crisis, with high repetition present. I chose secondary 
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data because the resources necessary to conduct nationwide interviews would have been 
difficult and costly as a graduate student. The questions asked of respondents of this 
survey coincided with the period directly before the Iraq War, therefore it makes this 
survey an ideal source of data to address the research question and hypotheses.  
I used binomial logistic regression analysis to determine if there was a 
relationship between the independent variable and the dependent variable. In binomial 
logistic regression, the dependent variable must be dichotomous (Laerd Statistics, 2015). 
The independent variable was education level of the respondents. Covariates included 
ideology, sex, race, income level, and political party. The dependent variables were: 
favor economic sanctions against Iraq, combating international terrorism as a foreign 
policy goal, Iraq developing weapons of mass destruction in the next 10 years, favor or 
oppose the use of U.S. troops if Iraq invaded Saudi Arabia, and, support for the United 
States using troops to invade Iraq and overthrow the government of Saddam Hussein.  
Definitions 
Agenda-setting: Messaging that is typically unintentional, and the consequence of 
the news media garnering ratings for the explicit purpose of sales. The journalistic focus 
of attention on issues that create salience, which influences perceptions and changes 
public opinion (McCombs, 2004/2014, p. 1).  
Propaganda: messaging to achieve a desired outcome that consciously and 
deliberately manipulates the information to influence behaviors and opinions (Bernays, 
1928, p. 38). 
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Repetition: A repeated message, or similar wording, which cumulates with higher 
impact psychologically than a single iteration, creating cohesion through “vocabulary 
links between sentences” (Fairclough, 1989, p. 54). 
Assumptions 
There were three underlying assumptions in this study. My first assumption was 
that because I used secondary data, the data set was error-free and complete. Second, 
because the study was based on survey data, I assumed the responses accurately reflect 
the underlying opinions of respondents. My final assumption was that respondents were 
exposed to frequent news coverage regarding the link between the terrorist attacks on 
September 11, 2001 and Iraq. 
My first assumption involved the collection of the secondary data through the use 
of primary interviewers. The American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy (2002) 
survey was conducted between June 1–30, 2002 by The Chicago Council on Foreign 
Relations, and The German Marshall Fund of the United States (funded by the 
MacArthur Foundation and the McCormick Tribune Foundation). The purpose of the 
survey was to determine the opinions and attitudes of the general public for research 
purposes and as a part of a quadrennial public opinion survey conducted since at least 
1978. All interviews were conducted by Harris Interactive, a professional polling firm 
and the data were collected by telephone and, personal interviews. Since the data were 
secondary in nature, I could not personally verify its accuracy. However, given the 
research was commissioned by non-profit organizations for the purpose of public opinion 
research, I concluded that the data were free from systematic errors.  
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My second assumption involved the use of survey data. Individuals questioned 
about public opinion must be taken at their word that they understood the questions and 
relevancy of the material and were honest in their responses since it is impossible to 
authenticate the answers of each participant.  
My third assumption was that individuals who responded to the survey were 
repeatedly exposed to news media stories regarding Iraq, terrorism, and the Middle East 
before the Iraq War. This assumption was necessary because the respondents were not 
asked about their news media usage or exposure to information regarding Iraq in the 
survey. President Bush’s use of repetition in messaging was very high in the year 
following September 11, 2001, with constant unsubstantiated claims of pending attacks in 
the United States (Donnelly, 2013). Kellner (2008) stated that Bush spoke in code, 
repeating the same phrases continually. Costenbader, Donahoe, Dry, Harvey, and Miller 
(2012) found a significant degree of repetition in President Bush’s speeches between 
September 11, 2001, and March 20, 2003. Even the pundits and experts that were not 
contributing new information to the debate maintained the same repetitive narratives 
already presented (Hampton, 2008), reinforcing daily talking points. The repetition of 
talking points was translated into repeated stories by the news media. Hampton (2008) 
collected all Federal News Washington transcripts of public speech from January 19, 
2001, to March 19, 2003 and found the 2,206 transcripts contained between 16 and 
72,000 pages of references to Iraq or Iraqi. The volume of these transcripts is an 
indication that most individuals who were exposed to the news media heard repeated 
stories about these topics and therefore this assumption was reasonable.  
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Scope and Delimitations 
In this study, I used agenda-setting to test if education levels had a relationship in 
shaping public opinion on public policy during periods of crisis, such as before the Iraq 
War. The scope of the study was the period before the Iraq War and appropriate because 
news coverage from the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks until the Iraq War had high-
messaging regarding U.S. foreign policy. The news media and Bush administration used 
repeated broadcasts and messages to inform the public, which changed public opinion.  
The findings of this study may not be generalizable to public opinion on foreign 
affairs in all situations, such as when low-messaging is present. Findings should be 
generalizable to foreign affairs where high-messaging is present. 
There were several alternative theories that I considered utilizing but did not 
address the research question as successfully as agenda-setting. Theoretical frameworks 
not chosen for study include Bandura’s (1986) social cognitive theory; Bernays’s (1928) 
use of Freudian theory; Biddle’s (1931) Psychological definition of propaganda theory; 
Cappella, Fishbein, Hornik, Ahern and Sayeed’s (2001) integrative theory of behavior 
change; Herman and Chomsky’s (1988/2002) propaganda model; Lasswell’s (1930/1977) 
theory of political propaganda; Lippman’s (1921/2010) public opinion theory; Mills’ 
conflict theory (1956/2000); Rogers’s (1995/2003) diffusion of innovations; and 
Stephenson and Witte’s (2001) extended parallel process model. I did not choose other 
current theories because they did not align with the research question as well, while early 
works were not chosen because there was no modern work to accompany them. I chose 
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agenda-setting as the theoretical framework because it is extant, evolving, and extends 
studies of propaganda research.  
Limitations 
Limitations can impact internal and external validity (Campbell & Stanley, 1966). 
My first internal limitation was the observer effect, concerning the awareness of 
participant honesty and that their answers were not changed to suit an alternative agenda. 
A second internal limitation may have existed in statistical regression, as that is the 
statistical method chosen to extrapolate the data. These internal threats may limit the 
generalizability of the study (Campbell & Stanley, 1966). 
Concerning external threats to validity, the first external limitation is that of 
selection bias, which may compromise the original study if randomness of participants 
was not an accurate representation of the population. Because these survey data were part 
of a quadrennial study by a reputable research organization, it was a reasonable 
expectation that sampling was well-conducted 2002.  
Personal bias on my part may have also limited the study. I am a United States 
Air Force veteran who is disabled. As a noncommissioned officer, I was a trainer and 
subject-matter expert in air base ground defense during the Gulf War. My expertise 
consisted of the defense of priority aircraft, nonpriority aircraft and structures, nuclear 
materials, explosive ordinance, missiles, fellow airmen, VIPs, and foreign dignitaries. I 
was a standby for deployment to Iraq and the Gulf. I did not have influence on messaging 
or its distribution outside of following a chain-of-command. My disabilities occurred 
within the confines of training scenarios and not during conflict.  
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Because the data are of a secondary nature, I was limited in my study by the steps 
taken by the original researchers in collecting the data. Any personal biases I may have 
had were eliminated through the use of secondary data and the utilization of standard 
statistical methods for analysis in this study. These issues did not affect bias, and no 
further measures were necessary. Despite the limitations in this study, this study provides 
insight into agenda-setting, education, and repetition. 
Significance 
This study was necessary because it extended the understanding of the 
relationship that education levels played in shaping public opinion on public policy 
during periods of crisis, such as before the Iraq War. The study relied on literature related 
to agenda-setting, education, and repetition within the framework of McCombs’s 
(2004/2014) agenda-setting theory. The study would be of interest to university 
academics, educators, policy legislators, and news media agencies because it offers new 
perspectives regarding periods of crises when messaging is high, the effects on public 
opinion, and agenda-setting theory.  
While agenda-setting is well-studied in political communication (Jenkins & 
Monroe, 2012; Johansen & Joslyn, 2008; McCombs, 2004/2014; Minor, 2013; O’Neal, 
2011; Steuter & Wills, 2008), there has been little, if any, research conducted linking 
agenda-setting, education, repetition, and public opinion, especially during times of war 
and crisis with high repetition. The amount of repetition survey respondents was exposed 
to is also unknown, but certain. As individuals orient themselves by mapping their world 
to fill in gaps, especially through news media and messaging, the individual becomes 
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more susceptible to the effects of agenda-setting by news media (McCombs, 1967; 
McCombs and Weaver, 1973; Tolman, 1932; Weaver, 1991; Westley & Borrow, 1959). 
To understand the complexities and effects of agenda-setting further, I conducted a 
quantitative study examining the role that education levels played in shaping public 
opinion on public policy during periods of crisis, such as before the Iraq War. 
The policy implications of this study are necessary to consider. Decades ago, 
American civics courses were mandatory learning in high school. Putnam (2000) stated 
that the generation born from 1910 to 1940 developed exceptional civic engagement that 
lasted until the present. The number of civics courses in the United States decreased from 
34 in 2001 to 21 states in 2012, with only nine states requiring students to pass a civics 
course to graduate high school (Civics Education Testing, 2012). The Department of 
Education noted failing grades on important information regarding the Constitution in 
Grades 4, 8, and 12, causing the executive director of the Center for Civic Education to 
state that educational policy now seems to be focused on developing workers instead of 
citizens (Dillon, 2011). The overall decline in education may jeopardize U.S. national 
security through stolen intellectual property resulting in a lack of economic growth and 
competitiveness (Crotty, 2012). National security may also be jeopardized through a lack 
of physical safety, global awareness, unity and cohesion. Political knowledge is a 
predictor of voting behavior, as those with more knowledge are more likely to vote than 
those with less knowledge (Delli Capini & Keeter, 1996; Popkin & Dimock, 1999). The 
decline of civics may be costly to the United States as there continues a steady loss of 
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legacy news media, while non-traditional news sources grow and the use of social media 
carries the risk of repeated propaganda exposure.  
The Information Age included exponential growth of knowledge and news media 
consolidation. Magazines are still regarded for their in-depth journalistic integrity and 
shape public opinion (Mueller & Reichert, 2009). While news media are still available in 
legacy formats such as newspaper, magazine, radio and television, digital content and 
cable news channels have overtaken much of that market, and in some cases, eliminated 
their competition. The proliferation of news media has not given rise to a more informed 
population. However, Bennet, Breuing, and Givens (2008) found that those citizens who 
dissented and protested against an impending Iraq War, particularly on February 15, 
2003, used social media to mobilize. Lenz and Lawson (2011) stated that television 
viewers focus on the physical appearances of candidates instead of content, influencing 
the merits of qualifications. Barnhurst (2011) finds the requisite time necessary for 
journalists to do their job has been undercut by demands for instant gratification in the 
digital era. 
In this study, I extended the theory of agenda-setting and benefitted public policy 
by improving how public opinion is formed, thereby improving policy initiatives. 
Implications for positive social change include demonstrating the need for civics 
coursework in K-12 education. One argument is that institutions are responsible for the 
impetus for social change because a representative democracy relies upon informed 
citizens who are actively educated. American civics courses, which used to be part of the 
curriculum, have been eliminated in many states. The removal of these lessons leave 
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graduating high school students less equipped than previous generations to engage in the 
democratic processes at the community level, regionally, and nationally. Understanding 
the relationship between education levels and public opinion would support the 
reinstitution of civics courses, which are fundamental to active citizenship. 
Conversely, the impetus for social change from this research may reside in the 
individual more than the institution. A self-informed citizenry may be more feasible if 
individuals act as gatekeepers of their own news media consumption rather than 
depending on other options for social change. Citizens must recognize the circumstances 
and types of messaging to filter, digest, and process.  
This study may further the understanding of how public opinions are shaped by 
crisis scenarios, help individuals and elected officials better understand the validity of 
polls, and inform better decision making. Because the Iraq War was the last war the 
United States was involved in and at the beginning of the 21st century, the results of the 
research are instructive moving forward, especially given how news media has affected 
public opinion with new methods. 
Summary 
Media agenda-setting impacts public opinion on foreign policy. Despite the research, 
gaps still exist detailing the role education plays in shaping public opinion during a 
foreign affairs crisis with repetitious and uniform news media. While education is 
thought to have a variety of benefits, such as informing better opinions (Makowsky & 
Miller, 2014) and stabilizing political opinions (Converse, 1964/2006; Zaller, 1991), the 
effect of education level in response to agenda-setting is unknown. Also, repetition of 
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messages by the news media may also increase the effectiveness of agenda-setting. 
Education levels that may normally create barriers to negative aspects of repetition and 
agenda-setting may be at risk during periods of crisis, affecting public opinion, such as 
before the Iraq War. McCombs’ (2004/2014) agenda-setting is the theoretical framework 
guiding this quantitative study.  
In Chapter 2, I will address relevant works within the theory of agenda-setting, I 
will also address public opinion and news media influence, the role of education, the 
impact of repetitive messages, and other factors that influence public opinion.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
News media using bold lettering, catchy phrases, images, and placement of 
articles to grab and hold the attention of their viewers are using agenda-setting tactics, 
which are essentially, marketing techniques. McCombs and Shaw (1972) found that 
placement and the frequency of news messaging had an impact upon public opinion, 
regardless of intent by the media. Agenda-setting by the news media creates the salience 
of the message that changes perceptions of public opinion (McCombs, 2004/2014). While 
agenda-setting is well-studied in political communication (Jenkins & Monroe, 2012; 
Johansen & Joslyn, 2008; McCombs, 2004/2014; Minor, 2013; O’Neal, 2011; Steuter & 
Wills, 2008), there has been little, if any, research conducted linking agenda-setting, 
education level, and repetition to shaping public opinion during a foreign affairs crisis. 
To understand the complexities of agenda-setting further, I conducted a quantitative case 
study to determine how education levels shape public opinion during a foreign affairs 
crisis within the context of repetitious and uniform news media coverage. 
Education affords attributes and opportunities to those who have obtained formal 
study. Those with higher levels of education are thought to have a more stable political 
ideology (Converse, 1964/2006; Zaller, 1991) and are less likely to change their political 
opinions (Johansen & Joslyn, 2008; Zaller, 1991) than those with less education. 
Individuals with higher education are often associated with significantly more effective 
critical thinking skills than their less educated counterparts (Zufari, 2013). Political 
knowledge prepares individuals with information needed to plan and implement effective 
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social approaches, which enables them to participate in actions that represent their 
attitudes efficiently (Visser, Holbrook, & Krosnick, 2008). Education prepares 
individuals to be active citizens but can be undermined by bias, as it obfuscates facts, 
rendering the decision-making process incomplete.  
Bias destroys objectivity, as only one viewpoint is expressed or favored. Biased 
news media were effective in changing public opinion before the Iraq War (DellaVigna 
& Kaplan, 2007). When only exposed to biased news media coverage preceding and 
during the Iraq War, the more educated were just as misinformed as the less educated 
(Johansen & Joslyn, 2008). Internationally, Baum (2013) found that countries with more 
political parties had more critical and diverse coverage of the Iraq War, resulting in more 
opposition to the war. While new electronic forms of media are burgeoning towards 
younger viewers and non-traditional ideologies, televised news programs in the United 
States are usually confined to network and cable news sources, which cater to mainstream 
ideas and traditional political party platforms. Johansen and Joslyn (2008) and Kull, 
Ramsay, and Lewis (2003) determined that out of all news media viewers, Columbia 
Broadcasting System (CBS) and Fox News viewers were the most misinformed. The U.S. 
news media reported few stories about foreign dissent of the Iraq War (Herber & Filak, 
2007). Lin (2009) found that even toward the end of the Iraq War, viewership of Fox 
News proved a predictor for support for the war, while non-Fox News programs proved 
insignificant predictors of support for war. Vosoughi, Roy, and Aral (2018) found that 
false news traveled significantly faster and farther than the truth. Biased news media 
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coverage may circumvent education, as inaccurate and misrepresented stories create 
flawed understandings of complex events. 
News media establish interest in topics based upon the need to remain relevant 
and up-to-date, with the intention of continuing coverage as necessary for ratings. 
Concurring news media messages have a direct correlation to message salience 
(McCombs, 2004/2014), which determines what topics are at the forefront in the minds 
and conversation of citizens. In turn, the news media messages can change public opinion 
(Brooks, 1985; Glynn, Herbst, Lindeman, O’Keefe, & Shapiro, 2016) and increase the 
likelihood of political action (Shaw & Hamm, 1997). Public opinion is shaped by the 
increased salience of the topic and can change policy as long as legislators have buy-in. 
The placement and frequency of coverage (repetition) are means to emphasize a message, 
creating increased salience of topic. 
In Chapter 2, I will present the search techniques and terms used within the 
literature search strategy. I will explore the theoretical foundation, providing a framework 
and history of the theory used in this study. I will provide a literature review of public 
opinion and news media influence, the role of education, the impact of repetitive 
messages, and factors beyond education that shape public opinion. Lastly, I will provide a 
summary and conclusion to Chapter 2. 
Literature Search Strategy 
I used the following search engines to complete the literature review: Academic 
Search Complete, Communication & Mass Media Complete, EBSCOhost, Education 
Research Complete, ERIC, Google Books, Google Scholar, International Security & 
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Counter Terrorism Reference Center, JSTOR, Political Science Complete, ProQuest, 
PsychArticles, PsychBOOKS, PsychCRITIQUES, PsychEXTRA, PsychINFO, Research 
Starters - Education, SAGE, ScienceDirect, and SocINDEX. 
Key search criteria I used were: agenda-setting; age statistics in politics; belief 
preservation; binomial logistic regression; Bush administration; civics courses; cognitive 
science; critical thinking (and real life, in education); decision-making; disinformation; 
educated vs non-educated; effective frequency; embedded journalism; foreign policy (and 
knowledge); formal education levels; sex statistics; high-messaging; international 
terrorism; internet usage; marketing strategies; mass media statistics; news media (and 
usage); military support for warfare; political party identification (and statistics); 
persuasion; political messaging; propaganda; public opinion; repetition; Saddam 
Hussein; sanctions; September 11, 2001; the Gulf War; the Iraq War; Vietnam public 
opinion statistics; and WWII public opinion statistics.  
I reviewed full articles and referenced further materials when appropriate. Other 
searches of literature, both peer-reviewed and published, were focused on the past 10 
years; however, many seminal works were outside of that period or had been updated by 
their respective authors/publishers.  
Theoretical Foundation 
The theoretical foundation for the study was developed initially by McCombs and 
Shaw (1972) to study the 1968 American presidential election. McCombs (2004/2014) 
further developed agenda-setting to study public opinion formation. By 2005, more than 
21 
 
400 articles had been published that rely on agenda-setting (McCombs, 2005). Agenda-
setting continues to be a relevant theory to understand how media shapes public opinion.  
The intention of news headlines is to capture the attention of the viewer, drawing 
them into the article or segment. McCombs and Shaw (1972) concluded that news media 
created increased salience of topic by increased coverage, thereby influencing public 
opinion. McCombs and Shaw studied five main topics (from nine major news sources) 
and calculated the number of news stories on each topic. Page position and length of a 
newspaper article lend credence to stories and this, in turn, influenced public opinion 
(McCombs, 2004/2014). Agenda-setting and priming are methods that news sources use 
to ensure that subjects are more prominent and accessible when individuals are forming 
opinions (Weaver, McCombs, & Shaw, 2004). An underlying assumption of agenda-
setting is that the news media creates interest in a topic, which creates a sense of 
importance to people.  
For agenda-setting to exist, two levels must be present. The first level involves the 
spread of message salience, delivering subjects of importance (awareness); the second 
level is the spread of characteristic increased salience (information), which determines 
which part of the subject is worth attention (Littlejohn & Foss, 2010). Agenda-setting is a 
three-step process (Benton & Frazier, 1976): the importance of the stories in the news 
media themselves, the topics of the stories must have an influence on public opinion, and 
public opinion influencing public policy. Lastly, news media affect agenda-setting and 
vice versa (Littlejohn, 2002). Therefore, news media filters and shapes news while 
focusing on narrow bands of issues intimating importance. 
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Agenda-setting has been used to study news media (McCombs, 1967; Merritt, 
1997; McCombs & Weaver, 1973; Weaver, 1991). Further, Weaver (1997) pointed to 
purposeful agenda-setting in the news media surrounding 1992 pre-election coverage by 
The Washington Post nationally and The Wichita Eagle in Kansas. Conway, Kenski, and 
Wang (2015) examined the use of Twitter in the 2012 U.S. presidential primary; 
Hopmann, Vliegenthart, De Vreese, and Albæk (2010) studied political party preference, 
Moon (2011) observed news media use and political participation, and Wood and Peake 
(1998) studied the dynamics of foreign policy.  
I selected McCombs’s (2004/2014) agenda-setting as the guiding theory for this 
study because it uses quantitative testing to determine how increased salience of message 
shapes public opinion. Increased salience is an aspect of news media messaging, 
especially with the advent of online news and the continuous coverage of dedicated news 
networks. McCombs (2004/2014) viewed the implications of agenda-setting as far 
reaching, with the consequences of news media messaging altering a wide range of 
behaviors, including how individuals think of policy and how they vote, no longer 
confined to the pictures in the mind of citizens. Muddiman, Stroud, and McCombs (2014) 
used agenda-setting to study the importance of cross-network viewing during the Iraq 
War. Atkin and Rice (2012) offered a definition of agenda-setting, stating, “The 
phenomenon of topical salience applies to campaign impact on the perceived importance 
of societal problems and the prominence of policy issues” (p. 4). Agenda-setting is an 
evolving theory that has been in use for more than 4 decades.  
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Public Opinion and News Media Influence 
Public opinion is crucial to public policy, as it drives support for diverse topics 
such as candidate favorability, legislation, and warfare. The president usually sets the 
tone, news agenda, and frames the argument for the news media and the public (Patrick 
& Thrall, 2007). These actions have historically garnered strong support for presidents. 
However, presidents must still vie for attention during news cycles and will lead only as 
far as the public will follow (Patrick & Thrall, 2007). During the normal course of events, 
public opinion varies in response over a period; when major events occur, such as 
military conflict, public opinion usually moves “strongly and universally in one 
direction” (Wolf & Holian, 2006, p. 587). Modern public opinion polling science dates to 
the period just before WWII, when President Roosevelt used such polling to shape public 
policy (Converse, 1987; Holsti, 2004). After WWII, new methods of social science 
research led to specific public opinion data relating to political interest (Converse, 1987). 
As the research of actual opinions grew, social scientists and news media used 
quantitative methods to gauge support, level-of-informed opinion, and favorability 
(McCombs, 2004/2014). Early studies concluded that even among the most prolific 
events of the era (WWII, nuclear technology, and the cold war), the knowledge of U.S. 
citizens remained very low (Almond, 1950). However, there is long-standing debate 
whether public policy responds to public opinion (Arrow, 1951/1963; Dahl, 1956; Sen, 
1970). Early studies regarding warfare and public opinion did not have a distinct pattern 
(Almond, 1950; Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1960; Converse, 1964/2006; 
Lippman, 1955/2009). By the Korean War and Vietnam War, casualty reports began to 
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affect public opinion regarding U.S. involvement in warfare (Milstein, 1973, Milstein & 
Mitchell, 1968; Mueller, 1971; Mueller, 1973). Public opinion tends to move policy more 
than policy changes public opinion; however, a policy may inform public opinion to 
some degree (Page & Shapiro, 1983). As news media becomes more abundant through a 
variety of sources, the influence of agenda-setting on public opinion could become more 
robust. 
One of the ways public opinion can influence public policy is when the news 
media cover stories, particularly when television news media uses agenda-setting. 
Sahlane (2012) determined the influence of the news media on sociopolitical issues 
undermines democracy through the deliberate interference of public opinion. Further, 
agenda-setting may give reciprocal action from policy to public opinion (Page, Shaprio, 
& Dempsey, 1987). People often change their minds to fit the cultural zeitgeist (Enns & 
Kellstedt, 2008); however, public opinion affects policy when the majority is stable (Page 
& Shapiro, 1983). Baum (2013) suggested the news media include more academic 
“research on the domestic sources of foreign policy and on international conflict,” 
allowing for more nuanced arguments presented by the news media (p. 456). Zaller 
(1991) stated that exposure to and reception of communication, as well as acceptance of 
the message, is dependent upon the level of political astuteness of the individual. This 
acceptance may also be attributed in part to the education level of the individual.  
Evidence suggests that legislation is tied to public opinion (Bartels, 1991; 
Erikson, MacKuen, & Stimson, 2002; Jacobs & Shapiro, 1996/2000; Monroe, 1998; Page 
& Shapiro, 1983; Stimson, MacKuen, & Erikson, 1995; and Wlezien, 2004), but Doyle 
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(2007) maintained that constituents only matter to politicians who are trying to stay in 
office. In this case, public opinion informs elected officials of the popularity of topics and 
it is necessary that legislators listen keenly. Individuals within special interest groups 
tend to focus on specific opinions, using those preferences to change legislation (Stimson, 
1999); however Page et al. (1987) found more than 20 cases where public opinion moved 
away from special interest group policy suggestions toward more general preferences. 
Further, a great deal of information is given to citizens from the news media by use of 
opinion leaders (pundits and political elites), who inform and influence news media 
consumers (Page et al., 1987; Watts & Dodds, 2007). Zaller (1992) disagreed somewhat, 
stating that while the exposure of elite opinions to citizens varies, exposure can “explain 
only a part of the variance in individual opinions,” although opinion is largely tied to 
news media exposure of elite discourse (p. 22). The literature on the impact of news 
media on foreign policy is limited (Eissler, Russell, & Jones, 2014). Elites control news 
media; their messages become the most pervasive, which sets an agenda, in turn affecting 
public opinion.  
Public opinion is still tenuous, despite persuasion techniques, and relies on other 
variables. Preconceived notions or prior knowledge is a baseline in the formation of 
public opinion, but opinions change as time elapses and news media coverage and its 
influence increase (Hoffman, Glynn, Huge, Sietman, & Thomson, 2007). Specific goals 
instead of political party identification are better indicators of influence on public 
opinion, especially about military action without the approval of the UN (as was the case 
with the Iraq War), approving policies, and actions that are congruent with their attitudes 
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(Holyk, 2011). Zaller (1991) agreed with Converse (1964/2006), insomuch as to say that 
individuals do not reason for themselves; they need contextualized ideas presented to 
them. As such, those with less education may be more open to suggestion, or to more 
suggestion than those with more or specific types of education. Public opinion is the 
uneasy, consensus of informed, and uninformed citizens on domestic, and foreign policy, 
whether influenced by public opinion leaders or not.  
Citizens care more about domestic than foreign policy, as it is easier to 
understand, and affects them directly. Foreign policy issues are more difficult to grasp 
because of the number of nations, allies, conflicts, trade agreements, partnerships, 
geopolitical factors, and relevant historical events. Eichenberg (2016) stated that on 
foreign policy, U.S. citizens share the same apathetic attitudes that they do on other 
political issues (Zaller, 1991), as do citizens from around the globe. U.S. public opinions 
on international affairs are so uninformed they may be classified as not having an 
opinion; and uninformed opinion may have very little impact on foreign policy (Holsti, 
2004). Foreign voices, on the other hand, influenced public opinion among Democrats 
and Republicans in the United States before the war in Iraq (Hayes & Guardino, 2011). 
Wanta, Golan and Lee (2004) determined that the more the news media covered another 
nation positively, the more U.S. citizens believed those nations to be of vital importance 
to U.S. interests, and the converse was true for negative stories on nations. Foreign policy 
has a direct effect on diplomacy with other nations regarding support for warfare.  
United States citizens are historically not as informed on foreign as they are on 
domestic policy. There is congruence within foreign policy and public opinion, since 
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there are examples following WWII to 1979 where government responded to polling on 
foreign (military aid for Nationalist Chinese; the Marshall Plan; European recovery) and 
domestic policy (the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971; legislation to ration 
gasoline) (Page & Shapiro, 1983). In the interim period between the Vietnam War and 
the Gulf War, Page et al. (1987) found little difference between domestic (70%) and 
foreign (62%) policies concerning knowledge of U.S. citizens. The more citizens become 
informed, the more they rely upon news media perspectives, controlled by elites 
especially for foreign policy (Zaller, 1992). It is with an eye toward diplomacy which 
keeps the United States at peace or propels the nation toward war utilizing foreign policy. 
Diplomacy often uses language in rhetoric to persuade both foreign national leaders, and 
U.S. public opinion.  
The role of the news media becomes more important during wartime, as 
journalists are reporting for who are not present (Fahmy & Johnson, 2005). News media 
influence during the Vietnam War was difficult to detect, and for this reason, researchers 
rarely attempt documentation concerning present evidence in advertising within elections, 
as an example (Zaller, 1991). Since the Vietnam War, the Pentagon has used the news 
media to control censorship by only reporting favorable content. The method of 
censorship has been effective by restricting access to only trusted news media outlets that 
could be used to instill patriotism (Kellner, 2008; Kumar, 2006; MacArthur, 2003; Thrall, 
2000), values that conservatives had a greater proclivity toward (Lin, 2009). However, 
few have used modern research to examine persuasion of news content, or endorsements 
in politics (Ladd & Lenz, 2009). In the case of the Iraq War, many journalists became 
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propagandists for the war, spinning messages from the Bush administration (Kellner, 
2008). Cobb and Elder (1973) stated that some topics such as war (drastic topics) are 
simultaneously in the news media and public; though this assertion is decades old, it is 
the way in which modern news media is disseminated that changed how frequently the 
messaging was observed by the public. The Vietnam War and the Iraq War may be 
decades apart; however, news media had an important role in each of these conflicts. 
The role of the news media on public opinion does not always reflect the accuracy 
of information. Further, “the media drive the content of poll questions” (Stroud & 
Sparrow, 2011, p. 162), which easily influences public opinion when results are given 
repeated attention from the news media. The news media did not hold the Bush 
administration accountable for “outrageous and false assertions about going to war in 
Iraq” (Harp, Loke, & Bachmann, 2010, p. 477). Further, the news media failed to ask 
tough unbiased questions and disregarded the best interests of an informed population, 
favoring sensationalism that translated into sales.  
Public opinion in the United States about intervention or invasion in Iraq after the 
Gulf War but before September 11, 2001, was not unilateral. With few exceptions, 
research on messaging held partisan indications; Democrats and Independents were 
optimistic when presented with information that disputed with their previous opinions, 
while Republican were more pessimistic when faced with opposing information (Gelpi, 
2010). Slusser and Williams (2008) found that support for military action in Iraq from 
1991 to 2003 had decreased in almost every socioeconomic category, with the notable 
exception of those Republicans earning less than $10,000 per year with less than a high 
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school education. This decrease in support between the Gulf War and the Iraq War may 
be due in part to continued airstrikes and sanctions against Hussein’s regime during 
President Clinton’s tenure, effectively rendering retaliation improbable. Furthermore, 
during the period between the Gulf War and the Iraq War, criticisms began to emerge and 
disseminate to citizens who wanted no part of such unnecessary conflicts.  
The decrease in support for military intervention began to change after the 
terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. In the period between the terrorist attacks and the 
lead-up to the invasion, polls had shown that those individuals who were more 
knowledgeable about the war with Iraq were less likely to support it, while the inverse 
was applicable: those who were for the war knew considerably fewer facts concerning it 
(Merzer, 2003). Stroud and Sparrow (2011) determined that public opinion polls were not 
consistent regarding terrorism and Iraq during the period between September 11, 2001, 
and the authorization by Congress to invade Iraq. Finnegan (2007) found stories that had 
an alarmist nature were often placed on the front page of newspapers with high 
circulations, adding to agenda-setting (Finnegan, 2007). Kull et al. (2003) found that 
those who watched CBS or Fox News were more likely to be factually misinformed 
about the Iraq War than those who used National Public Radio (NPR) or Public 
Broadcasting Station (PBS) as their primary source of news. In reporting on the Iraq War, 
Fox News was more favorable to the Bush administration (Aday, 2010) than their 
counterparts, CNN and MSNBC (Muddiman et al., 2014). A Knight-Ridder poll in 
January 2002 suggested that American citizens who knew more about the build-up of the 
war were less likely to take a militaristic or aggressive perspective; the individuals who 
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were educated were less likely to support military action (Sheldon & Stauber, 2003). 
Rampton and Stauber (2003) stated that the gap in knowledge and hawkishness is not by 
accident. The role of education levels and public opinion offers insight into how the two 
are related. 
In the case of the Iraq War, the average citizen did not have access to classified 
intelligence and was not privy to national security briefings. A former national 
intelligence officer for the CIA leveled the accusation that the Bush administration 
intentionally misused or disregarded intelligence used as justification for the invasion of 
Iraq instead of utilizing the tools of the intelligence community (Fox, 2006; Pincus, 2006; 
van der Heide, 2013). In addition, President Bush asserted that Hussein/Iraq had links to 
al Qaeda (Allen, 2002); these assertions later proved false. President Bush delivered a 
public address to the UN that advocated binary thinking, stating, “you’re either with us or 
against us in the fight against terror” (You Are Either with Us, 2001). President Bush’s 
assertion had the intention of being a black and white issue. Instead, Bush’s message was 
perceived internationally as an ultimatum that weakened diplomatic ties. U.S. news 
sources merely repeated Bush’s message without questioning its legitimacy and legality. 
The Role of Education 
The role education plays in critical thinking influences the ability to sort 
information, such as news media, during times of war and crisis with high media 
coverage (Converse, 1964/2006). Research suggests that those with more education have 
better health, healthier lifestyles, live longer, and make better choices in their lives than 
their less educated counterparts (Feinstein, Sabates, Anderson, Sorhaindo, & Hammond, 
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2006; Visser, Holbrook, & Krosnick, 2008). Formal education helps to stabilize political 
opinions (Converse, 1964/2006; Zaller, 1991) by altering prevailing biases, 
preconceptions, policies, and social customs (Gardner, 2009). Together, education and 
intelligence enhance the opinions of each citizen. The educated are socially accepted to 
have more knowledge than uneducated citizens. Critical thinking is an integral part of 
intelligence, but it is important to note that higher education is no guarantee of 
knowledge (Deary & Johnson, 2010). The idea of those with education having knowledge 
is largely predicated on the notion that the educated can use outside influencers to their 
advantage and can sift through more information and extract better data.  
Education shapes public opinion on matters of government policy (Converse, 
1964/2006; Zaller, 1991), however, most citizens are uninformed, ambivalent and 
conflicted about complex issues (Eichenberg, 2016; Zaller, 1992; Zaller & Feldman, 
1992). The highly educated and people with strong knowledge of politics have complex 
ideologies regarding domestic and foreign policies (Feldman & Lynch, 1988). The 
phenomenon of education affecting political attitudes during elections started to become 
relevant in the late 1960s (Nie & Andersen, 1974). Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) 
discovered strong correlations between political knowledge and participation in politics. 
In research of non-educated and educated citizens using emotion to help code 
information, the gap “narrowed for emotionally personalized stories. These findings 
confirm that education levels drive information acquisition gaps” (Bas & Grabe, 2015, p. 
176). While political knowledge is not directly measured in public opinion surveys, 
education is often used as a proxy (Neuman, 1986), as exemplified in research regarding 
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attitudes on domestic policies (Anderson, 1998). While citizens may vote according to 
their interests regarding public policy (Stimson, 1999), many do not (Becker & Mulligan, 
2016). Domestic policy differs from foreign policy, as it is exponentially more 
complicated. It is unclear whether there is a causal relationship between foreign policy 
and public opinion due to fewer studies investigating connections between them (Holsti, 
1992; Light & Lake, 1985; Mello, 2014). Education and the influence of the public 
opinion leaders in modern news media may correlate with political opinions since it is 
their perspectives being broadcast extensively. 
Public opinion leaders influence public opinion through individuals; however, 
research suggests that individuals may inflate their knowledge if they are unfamiliar with 
political information. Lasorsa (2009) found that women and those with less education, 
income, and were younger in age tended to inflate their political interest when presented 
with probing political questions. However, lack of information and education about 
perceived threats may not reflect mass public opinion post-September 11, 2001 within the 
United States and United Kingdom (Buckmaster & McKenzie, 2009). These results may 
indicate in part that older citizens are better informed than their younger counterparts, 
perhaps due to their choice of news media sources. Makowsky and Miller’s (2014) 
research indicated that the ideal swing voter pool would be full of highly intelligent high 
school graduates, and few individuals with college degrees. Based on these research 
findings of Buckmaster and McKenzie (2009), Lasorsa (2009) and Makowsky and Miller 
(2014), an ideal voter is young, highly intelligent, but uninformed, and perhaps female. 
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The inflated supposition of political knowledge is in opposition to the thoughtful 
response on administration directives, policy, and casualties.  
Public opinion on warfare in the United States has remained relatively steady for 
decades. Support for warfare among the educated had not changed significantly since 
WWII when support was low (American Public Differs from Experts, 1939). During the 
Vietnam War, public opinion in support of war among the educated began shifting 
toward an anti-war stance as foreign policy knowledge increased (Zaller, 1991). Data 
suggests that public opinion began to change in greater numbers in the early stages of the 
Iraq War, with rising vocal dissent amongst the educated (Burris, 2003). Johansen and 
Joslyn (2008) examined news media coverage preceding and during the Iraq War and 
discovered education offered no protection against propaganda when news was obtained 
from a singular source. As public opinion becomes more recognized as a motivating 
factor influencing public policy, the importance of education and levels of attainment 
may be important in circumventing repetitious and uniform media messaging. 
Critical thinking blocks indoctrination by challenging messages, which is an 
obstacle a propagandist must overcome to ensure their message is persuasive (Rampton 
& Stauber, 2003). Rampton and Stauber (2003) stated the bypassing of the rational brain 
through emotional symbolism is meant to manipulate individuals on a primal level. Even 
auditory symbolism is important, as music and score set the tone to mirror the desired 
feeling (Borchers, 2013; Sellnow, 1996). News media during the lead-up to the Iraq War 
used metaphor, symbolism, slogans, iconography, and music repeatedly to persuade 
public opinion. There is a gap in the literature about the role education levels play in 
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shaping public opinion during a foreign affairs crisis within the context of repetitious and 
uniform news media coverage. 
The Impact of Repetitive Messages 
The impact of repetitive messages may create a more favorable environment to 
agenda-setting, which affects public opinion. The old folk adage and propagandist 
maxim, that when a lie is repeated often it can be accepted as truth, has been confirmed 
by cognitive science studies in repetition by Arkes, Hackett and Boehm (1989); Bacon 
(1979); Begg, Anas and Farinacci (1992); Begg and Armour (1991); Begg, Armour and 
Kerr (1985); Brown and Nix (1996); Gigerenzer (1984); Hasher, Goldstein and Toppino 
(1977); Rampton and Stauber (2003); and Schwartz (1982). Redundant messaging helps 
duplicate the core idea and create connections to actions, and circumstances (Clampitt, 
2012). Brown and Nix (1996) found that if the false repetitious information is not 
corrected immediately, it becomes solidified as truth to the viewer. Asch stated that even 
most reasonable people would agree that it is easy to “manipulate opinions and 
sentiments almost at will” (1952, p. 617). Further, Asch (1952) found the idea that human 
beings could be so easily suggestible and put so little effort into processing information, 
that it painted a pessimistic portrait of the human psyche. Stone and McCombs (1981) 
suggested that it takes between two and six months for themes to become part of the 
public consciousness. Repetition of news message contributes to increased salience of 
message, creating agenda-setting. 
The number of iterations of a message delivered to change opinion is unknown, 
and while not an exact science, repetition is known to have a direct impact on memory 
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and personality traits. Kim, Han, Choi and Kim (2012) found that in Korea, testing of 
Stone and McCombs (1981) hypothesis, using a longer period of twelve months, resulted 
in the discovery that news pieces that covered a particular topic from two to five times 
more often than other stories were identifiable by viewers. Kim et al. (2012) pointed out 
that the effect of accessibility is usually short-term, however, other research suggests 
agenda-setting and priming are longer lasting (Krosnick & Brannon, 1993; Stone & 
McCombs, 1981). Also, Kim et al. (2012) discovered that agenda-setting worked so long 
as viewers watched the news. Kim et al’s (2012) results relating to the repetition of news 
media messaging could be generalizable to the United States particularly if news stories 
have an emotional component. Repetition alters not only memory, but also reinforces 
and/or creates habits, attitudes, and values, especially when emotion is involved. 
While emotion within news stories is frowned upon by journalism schools and 
media watchdogs, it has played a role in media, especially when warfare is imminent or 
ongoing. Emotion is viewed as a liability to rationality and informed citizenry (Bas & 
Grabe, 2015). Boaz (2011) listed 14 propaganda techniques that Fox News, specifically, 
uses in their broadcasts: panic mongering; character assassination/ad hominem; 
projection/flipping; rewriting history; scapegoating/othering; conflating violence with 
power and opposition to violence with weakness; bullying; confusion; populism; 
invoking the Christian God; saturation; disparaging education; guilt by association and 
diversion. In many cases, what is being saturated/repeated does not have to have merit or 
be factual, if it is repeated enough, someone will believe the lie, especially if the assertion 
is untrue and not fact-checked. Vosoughi, Roy, and Aral (2018) discovered that while 
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false news traveled significantly “faster, deeper, and more broadly than the truth,” false 
political news, was more pronounced than any other category (p. 1150). Emotion used in 
stories is exacerbated when used in volume through repetition. 
Fast stimuli, like 24-hour news channels, use repetition not only to tell narratives 
but also when the news is slow to fill time, which leaves viewers unable to keep up with 
the volume of potential misinformation. Huxley (1958) viewed all forms of media as 
neutral and recognized that in repressive societies repetitious message utilization of the 
same idea was an “immensely powerful instrument” for propaganda, especially by use of 
radio and television. Individuals are now faced with a bombardment of messages that 
arrive through a variety of media, including logos, brochures, pamphlets, advertisements, 
and viral Internet campaigns (Dardis, 2009). When news media distribute 
misinformation, the potential for alteration of public opinion is present. The news, 
generally for profit, is delivered to audiences to inform, persuade (Fortunato & Martin, 
2016), and increasingly, to entertain (Graber, 1994; Hallin, 1990; Mellado & van Dalen, 
2016; Taylor, 1998; Thussu, 2007). News sources contribute to repetitious messaging 
because saturation of information is profitable to business, as it equates to expanded 
viewership and larger advertising revenue. Since news media delivery mechanisms have 
changed greatly in past two decades, the messages they deliver are almost incalculable to 
the average citizen.  
Advertising and marketing research use effective frequency (repetition), to reach 
a target audience repeatedly to result in the message acceptance before being rendered 
useless (Rethans, Swasy, & Marks, 1986). There does not seem to be a specific message 
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delivery number to reach the desired yield, but making a memorable impact is necessary. 
Long-lasting results are obtained by continuous repetition in all media formats, as talk 
radio and the Internet can keep an issue salient long after traditional legacy news media 
have changed its focus (Ratner & Scarrah, 2006). While Janiszewski and Meyvis (2001) 
also studied marketing concepts, their conclusions somewhat echo Kitson (1927) with the 
exception that it is difficult to address when the influence began by stating that repeated 
exposure influences and evidence points to processing fluency, which results in 
preference. The effects of repetition are still being studied and understood by cognitive 
scientists, and delivery, as well as a specific number or repetitions remain elusive, unique 
or situational. 
Increased news media presence due to technology ensures the repetition of 
messages, and thus saliency. CNN’s Wolf Blitzer acknowledged the effect of repetition 
of information given by government officials that were broadcast by the news media was 
tantamount to groupthink (Blitzer, 2004). According to the Pew Research Center (2014), 
Internet usage between September 2001 (the period before the Iraq War) and August 
2011 (just before the ending of the Iraq War), went from 59% to 78% of households. The 
assumption of repetition of the message is important because of the volume of 
information before, and during the Iraq War, suggests consumption of that media 
messaging was on a massive scale and inescapable, omnipresent, and unprecedented. 
Because of the nature of modern news media, messaging is now unavoidable, especially 
in times of war and crisis such as before the Iraq War.  
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Factors Beyond Education that Shape Public Opinion  
Public opinion is complex, and many factors are part of the process of shaping it. 
Education is one of the primary drivers, as addressed above, but there are other factors 
that need to be considered in this study. Key demographics that aid in the understanding 
of public opinion includes ideology, sex, race, income level, and political party. I used 
these variables to control for systematic differences in public opinion.  
With age comes an interest in politics, and current events. Traditionally, older 
U.S. citizens tend to be interested in policy as it affects their attitudes and values, needs 
and goals (Caprara, Capanna, Vecchione, & Barbaranelli, 2006; Krosnick, 1988), 
however, this may no longer be the case. Regardless of political demographic, citizens 
are becoming more politically active at younger ages, such as at the high school level or 
younger, who may be sensitive to policies that directly affects them. Fahmy (2006/2016) 
stated that linking a specific causality to the political system and young people is 
difficult. A specific age is difficult to pinpoint, though the proclivity to use media and be 
exposed to news stories has become more commonplace with young people consuming 
new media sources. There is a rise in pro-government youth, but it is unclear if this trend 
will continue (Benedict-Nelson, 2012). Lee and Yang (2014) found that news media 
viewers in Korea who relied heavily upon legacy news media tend to have more political 
knowledge than those who either avoided news or only consumed emerging news media 
(The Internet, and social media). While older citizens tend to cling to legacy media, 
sources are changing due to the influx of technology, affecting citizens at younger ages 
than previously understood. 
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The Internet has grown as a source for news media since its broad use as an 
informational tool, with younger citizens who are accustomed to using it their entire 
lives. Data regarding Internet usage is varied; Davis (1999) asserted that the Internet does 
not initiate political interest, while Bonchek (1997) believed that it increased the political 
information that resulted in more participation. Wang (2007) agreed with Bonchek 
(1997), finding the Internet has “positive effects on political attitudes and political 
participation” (p. 393). Civic education has been in decline for the past few decades in 
the United States (Galston, 2001), and impacts the formation of public opinion, 
particularly with the use of Internet news (Wang, 2007). While there are exceptions, 
many minors, and young adults are not actively engaged in the political process. After the 
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the idea of reinstating the draft was discussed, as 
was compulsory service (Kamarck, 2016), but neither policy garnered public or political 
support for implementation (Ross, 2011), yet these policy initiatives garnered only apathy 
among the young citizens who would have been directly affected. Age is correlated with 
where U.S. citizens get their news, so it is important to consider age in analyzing public 
opinion. Senior citizens preferred CBS and Fox News before the Iraq War (Rich, 2014), 
while younger citizens are more likely to obtain their news from social media (Barthel, 
Shearer, Gottfried, & Mitchell, 2015; Duggan, 2015; Holcomb, Gottfried, & Mitchell, 
2013). Younger citizens tend to be more drawn to breaking news than their older 
counterparts (Social and Demographic Differences, 2014). While many age groups get 
their news from social media, younger citizens are inclined to do so more than their older 
peers.   
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Earlier studies indicated that Facebook influenced political participation and 
protest (Gil de Zúñiga, Jung, & Valenzuela, 2012; McClurg, 2003), however, later studies 
from Chan (2016) and Theocharis and Lowe (2015) found evidence that Facebook does 
not aid in electoral campaign participation. Social media, while powerful in making 
citizens aware, does little to sway them to participate in democracy. Paulo Serra (2014) 
posited that citizens displeased with government propaganda in mainstream news media 
turn to the Internet as alternative news sources. President Obama (as cited in Solon, 
2016b) stated in a press conference in Germany with respect to misinformation on social 
media that, “if we can’t discriminate between serious arguments and propaganda, then we 
have problems” (para. 2). Social media has recently come under fire for being a 
propaganda tool by way of disseminating false information against political rivals and 
ideologies. Vosoughi, Roy, and Aral’s (2018) research indicated that humans were 
responsible for spreading false news stories on the social media site, Twitter, not bots, 
and political stories were spread faster and farther than any other type of news story. The 
issue of veracity is the obvious concern, especially regarding issues of national 
importance and the mere ability for false stories to influence public opinion. 
Political Party identification seems to condition opinions of citizens. Jones (2003) 
found political party identification was a key indicator of military support against Iraq. 
Before the Iraq War, overall support for the invasion was 76% (Erikson & Tedin, 2010), 
with Republican support at 93% (Jones, 2003). Democrats typically favor anti-war 
policies, however, before the Iraq War, the Democratic political party leadership was 
unclear of their stance on the invasion, which became a temporary anomaly. Before the 
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Iraq War, Democratic support of invasion was at 53% (Jones, 2003). Other studies found 
between 57% and 59% favoring diplomacy rather than an invasion of Iraq (Berinsky, 
2007; Erikson & Tedin, 2010; Hetherington & Suhay, 2011). When the Democratic 
political party did find unity on the issue of Iraq, the War was mired in controversy, 
casualties, and cost. It became difficult for dissenters to have a voice, as the Bush 
administration and supporters of the Iraq War perpetually changed the goals and 
questioning their support of the troops, patriotism, and loyalty to their country.  
Socioeconomic status such as ideology, sex, race, income level, and political 
party can also affect public opinion. Individuals with income less than $10,000 per year 
supported military action in Iraq from 1991 to 2003 (Slusser & Williams, 2008). In one 
study on foreign policy among college students, males scored slightly higher than 
females, with the authors hypothesizing that females may learn differently than their male 
counterparts (Arbitter, Bach, Berkowitz, Brown, & Krebs, 2011). Seventy-seven percent 
of men favored the Iraq War, while 66% of women were in support (Jones, 2003). 
Overall support for the Iraq War by Whites was 78%, while Black support was at 29% 
(Jones, 2003). With sharp divides between socioeconomic demographics, clear lines of 
support were drawn. 
Republicans were more apt to favor the Iraq War than their Democratic 
counterparts. The Iraq War was initiated by the Bush administration and highly supported 
by the Republican political party throughout, while Democratic and general support 
decreased markedly in May 2004 (Berinsky, 2007; Everts & Isernia, 2005). Ideology, 
sex, race, income level, and political party variables are all factors that may shape public 
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opinion. I controlled for each of these in my statistical analysis, so they did not affect the 
dependent variable. This way I determined the relationship between the independent 
variable of education levels on the dependent variables and avoided any confounding 
effects (Vogt & Johnson, 2011).  
Summary and Conclusion 
 In Chapter 2, I presented an introduction to the theoretical foundation of agenda-
setting. The purpose of this quantitative research study was to determine the role that 
education levels played in shaping public opinion on public policy during periods of 
crisis, such as before the Iraq War. The frequency and placement of news as subject 
matter by news media that creates agenda-setting (McCombs, 2004/2014). McCombs 
(2004/2014) detailed how agenda-setting creates salience, especially in situations similar 
to the period before the Iraq War. Public opinion is shaped through agenda-setting by the 
news media, and delivered by media elites to change public opinion and policy through 
the method of increased message salience (McCombs, 2004/2014). Both repetition and 
agenda-setting helped shape the news messages the public heard before the Iraq War.  
 Education is thought to provide a role when critically viewing news stories, 
propaganda and political commentary, but this may not occur in all situations. Education 
has many benefits on the individual, including to help stabilize political opinions 
(Converse, 1964/2006; Zaller, 1991) and informs better opinions (Makowsky & Miller, 
2014), though there is no guarantee of intelligence (Deary & Johnson, 2010). However, 
there is a correlation between higher education and knowledge of complex ideologies, 
domestic, and foreign policies (Feldman & Lynch, 1988). Johansen and Joslyn (2008) 
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examined news media coverage preceding and during the Iraq War and discovered 
education offered no protection against propaganda when news was obtained from a 
singular source. Education may not be a protective barrier for viewers when repetition is 
present. 
Repetition contributes to the role in which individuals recall and process 
information methodology. The Bush administration and the news media heavily relied 
upon repetition and metaphor, which were inescapable before the Iraq War and changed 
public opinion. Message repetition may enhance memory action (Brown & Nix, 1996; 
Dubuisson et al., 2012; Lakoff, 2006; Rampton & Stauber, 2003; Saville, 2011; Schreiber 
et al., 2013), but it may be at odds with critical thinking (Gordon, Soldan, Thomas, & 
Stern, 2013). Further, Brown and Nix (1996) outlined a large body of literature that 
supports the effect of repetition on perception, and Rampton and Stauber (2003) 
documented the occurrence of agenda-setting before and during the Iraq War. Repetition 
equates to news media saturation, ensuring messages are consumed in some capacity.  
There was a gap in the literature regarding the role that education levels play in 
shaping public opinion on public policy during periods of crisis, such as before the Iraq 
War. Research is currently limited on repetition and its effects on public opinion and 
agenda-setting. Agenda-setting may circumvent aspects of political knowledge that an 
education provides during periods of crisis such as before the Iraq War. The purpose of 
this research was to determine if there was a relationship between education levels in 
public opinion before the Iraq War. 
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In Chapter 3, I will address the methodology I used to examine the research 
question regarding the relationship between education levels and public opinion in the 
year before the United States war with Iraq. I chose to use secondary data from the 
American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy survey of 2002 to address the research 
question, and associated hypotheses. Binomial logistic regression analysis were used to 
test the relationship between education, and public opinion before the Iraq War. I will 
also discuss threats to validity and ethical considerations in the chapter. 
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Chapter 3: Research Method 
Introduction 
Agenda-setting may bypass education and political knowledge with messages that 
speak to emotion instead of intellect. Repetition of messaging may enhance the 
effectiveness of agenda-setting, and it is unknown if education affects agenda-setting in a 
repetitive environment. Agenda-setting is well-studied in political communication 
(Jenkins & Monroe, 2012; Johansen & Joslyn, 2008; McCombs, 2004/2014; Minor, 
2013; O’Neal, 2011; Steuter & Wills, 2008); however, little if any research has been 
conducted linking agenda-setting, education, and repetition. To understand these linkages 
further, I examined the role that education levels played in shaping public opinion on 
public policy during periods of crisis, such as before the Iraq War. To do so, I used 
secondary data analysis on a survey of public opinions regarding a wide variety of 
foreign policy questions before the Iraq War. 
Chapter 3 includes descriptions of the research design rationale, the secondary 
data from Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research that I used for 
the study, a detailed explanation of methodology, the data analysis used, issues of 
validity, and ethical concerns. Lastly, I will provide a summary and transition into 
Chapter 4. 
Research Design and Rationale 
The purpose of the quantitative study was to determine if there is a relationship 
between education level attainment and public opinion before the Iraq War. I conducted a 
quantitative study that employed binomial logistic regression using a secondary data set, 
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Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research Study Number 3673, 
which was a study of public opinion before the Iraq War. The American Public Opinion 
and U.S. Foreign Policy (2002) nonexperimental survey data were gathered between June 
1–30, 2002 by The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, and The German Marshall 
Fund of the United States (funded by the MacArthur Foundation and the McCormick 
Tribune Foundation). Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research was 
part of a quadrennial series investigating opinions and attitudes of the general public 
about funding, aid, support, opposition, policy goals, treaties, terrorism, justification of 
troop involvement, invasion of Iraq, and the overthrow of Saddam Hussein (Chicago 
Council on Foreign Relations, 2002). American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 
(Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 2002) included two parts. Part 1: opinion leader 
data (decision-makers in positions of leadership in government, academia, business, 
labor, media, religious institutions, special interest groups, and private foreign policy 
organizations) and, Part 2: general population data from a national probability sample 
(men and women over the age of 18). For this analysis, I only used Part 2 as it could be 
used to test assumptions about public opinion during a 30-day period before the Iraq War.  
My objective for this study was to determine if there was a relationship between 
the independent variable of interest, education level, with different questions regarding 
public opinion related to Iraq. Five dependent variables were tested: favor economic 
sanctions against Iraq, combating international terrorism as a foreign policy goal, Iraq 
developing weapons of mass destruction in the next 10 years, favor or oppose the use of 
U.S. troops if Iraq invaded Saudi Arabia, and, support for the United States using troops 
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to invade Iraq and overthrow the government of Saddam Hussein. Covariates included 
ideology, sex, race, income level, and political party. I analyzed the data using binomial 
logistic regression to test five hypotheses because the dependent variables were 
dichotomous. The nature of the research question was best addressed with a quantitative 
approach because it relied on public opinion data collected by a survey in the past.  
It was necessary to obtain secondary data collected during a period when public 
opinion on foreign affairs was high due to the impending preemptive strike against, 
subsequent invasion, and war with Iraq. The timing and the questions asked of 
respondents of this survey coincide directly with the period before the Iraq War and 
effectively captures public opinion at that time. The importance of the time-frame was to 
have statistical data on public opinion surrounding the events before the Iraq War. It 
would have been impossible for me as a graduate student with limited resources and 
access to conduct a national study. Further, using a secondary data set is necessary, as the 
study deals with events and public opinion in the past, immediately preceding the Iraq 
War, so the data can no longer be collected.  
Methodology 
The data I used for this study were originally used in the American Public 
Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy survey of 2002. The data were collected by telephone, 
and personal interviews of the general population from June 1, 2002–June 30, 2002, and 
the Project Managers were David Krane, and Shawn Wade (Chicago Council on Foreign 
Relations, 2002). The unit of observation was the individual. The population for the 
sample was all people over the age of 18 in the United States (Chicago Council on 
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Foreign Relations, 2002). The researchers used a national probability sampling technique 
to collect the data. The data set includes a total of 3,262 respondents with 2,862 being 
from phone interviews and 400 in-home interviews. All interviews were conducted by 
Harris Interactive. All participation of respondents was voluntary. The survey was 
designed to certify equal representation of households in differing regions such as city, 
suburban, and rural areas within the United States (Chicago Council on Foreign 
Relations, 2002). Harris Interactive supervisory staff continually monitored the 
interviews to ensure quality results (Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 2002).  
In conducting statistical analysis, such as binomial logistic analysis, it is critical to 
determine if the sample size is large enough to determine if the results are statistically 
significant. I completed a power analysis based on the overall population in the United 
States of those 18-years-old and above; a total of 344 respondents were needed to have a 
margin of error of 5%, and a confidence level of 95% (Raosoft, 2004). Because the 
sample size in the dataset was 3,262 respondents, it was large enough to test my 
hypotheses and find statistical significance.  
The secondary data set needed for this study was available through ICPSR, of 
which Walden University is a member. As a Walden student, I had access to the dataset. I 
downloaded the data set after IRB gave approval; no other permissions were needed. The 




Operationalization of Variables 
I chose the variables for this study with the consideration of alignment to the 
research question, and relevance to the topic. The variables I chose are defined below 
based on American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy, 2002 (2002). Coding can be 
viewed in Table 1. 
Independent Variable 
Education level. This variable captured the respondent’s last grade of school 
completed. 
Dependent Variables 
Favoring economic sanctions against Iraq. This variable was measured by asking 
respondents if they favor or oppose the use of economic sanctions against Iraq.  
Combating international terrorism as a foreign policy goal. This variable was 
measured by asking respondents their opinion about combating international terrorism as 
a U.S. foreign policy goal. Answers were given on a Likert scale of very important, 
somewhat important, and not important at all. I determined that the observations were 
less than 2% without simplifying categories. However, once the data were analyzed, there 
were very few (less than 2%) of the respondents who answered that combating 
international terrorism as a foreign policy goal was not at all important. Given the lack of 
variance in the (lower/higher) end of the scale, the two responses not at all important and 
somewhat important were merged into a new variable. Further, making the 
transformation allowed the hypothesis to be tested using a binomial logistic regression 
model instead of multiple ordinal regression.   
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Iraq developing weapons of mass destruction in the next 10 years. This variable 
was classified by listing possible threats to the vital interest of the United States in the 
next 10 years, there are three potential responses: critical threat, important but not 
critical threat, not an important threat at all. I determined that the observations were less 
than 2% without simplifying categories. However, once the data were analyzed, there 
were very few (less than 2%) of the respondents who answered that Iraq developing 
weapons of mass destruction in the next 10 years was not at all important. Given the lack 
of variance in the (lower/higher) end of the scale, the two responses not at all important 
and important but not critical were merged into a new variable. Further, making the 
transformation allowed the hypothesis to be tested using a binomial logistic regression 
model instead of multiple ordinal regression. 
Favor or oppose the use of U.S. troops if Iraq invaded Saudi Arabia. This 
variable was classified by asking respondents if there was justification for using U.S. 
troops if Iraq invaded Saudi Arabia. Respondents were asked if they favor or oppose the 
use of U.S. troops.  
Support for the United States using troops to overthrow Saddam Hussein’s 
government. This variable was selected as respondents were asked whether the United 
States should use its troops to invade Iraq and overthrow the government of Saddam 
Hussein. Respondents were asked if they favored or opposed.  
Covariates 
  Ideology. This variable was identified by asking respondents how they would 
describe their political views.  
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Sex. This variable ascertained if the respondent identified as male or female.   
Race. This variable was identified by asking respondents their race and ethnic 
origin.  
Income level. I selected income level as a variable to ascertain the respondent’s 
total 2001 household income.  
 Political Party affiliation. This variable was created to determine political party 
affiliation. Using Q1010, where each respondent identified which political party 
affiliation they considered themselves: Republican; Democratic; Independent; or other. 
The Independents who leaned were merged into the Republican or Democratic parties, 
respectively, with the true independents narrowed down from those that remained and 
who identified as independent. Those without political party identification of Republican, 







Values and Categories of Variables 
 
Variables Categories 
Education 0 = 8th grade or less, 1 = Some high school, 
2 = High school graduate, 3 = Some 
college, 4 = College graduate, 5 = 
Postgraduate study 
Economic sanctions against Iraq 0 = Oppose, 1 = Favor 
International Terrorism 0 = Not important at all/somewhat 
important, 1 = Very important 
Iraq will develop WMDs 0 = Not an important threat at all/important 
but not critical threat, 1 = Critical threat 
U.S. troops if Iraq invaded S. Arabia 0 = Oppose, 1 = Favor 
Overthrow Saddam Hussein/Iraq 0 = Oppose, 1 = Favor 
Ideology 0 = Very liberal, 1 = Fairly liberal, 2 = 
Middle of the road, 3 = Fairly conservative, 
4 = Very conservative 
Sex 0 for male, and 1 for female 
Race 0 for non-Hispanic White and 1 for all other 
groups 
Income level 0 = $14,999 or less, 1 = $15,000 - $24,999, 
2 = $25,000 - $34,999, 3 = $35,000 - 
$49,9999. 4 = $50,000 - $74,999, 5 = 
$75,000 - $99,999, 6 = $100,000 - 
$124,999, 7 = $125,000 - $149,999, 8 = 
$150,000 - $199,999, 9 = $200,000 - 
$249,999, 10 = $250,000 or more 
Political Party 0 = Republican, 1 = Democratic 
 
Data Analysis Plan 
I used binomial logistic regression to test those hypotheses because the dependent 
variables were binary. I used Statistical Packages for Social Sciences version 24 software 
(SPSS 24.0) to test the hypotheses.  
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Because the data were of a secondary nature, a careful review was necessary to 
clean, and remove any identifying information, or errors within the data set. This required 
a visual and electronic inspection of the data fields to ensure mitigation of errors 
(Osborne, 2012). Additionally, I ran a frequencies check to ensure there were not missing 
data fields in the data set and recoded any missing variables by inputting a value of 99. 
Any case with a missing value in the regression equation was omitted from the analysis. 
As outlined above, it was necessary to recode some of the data and merge 
variables because of the infrequent observations in some categories. These issues were 
addressed by re-coding the data by hand and extensive double checking to ensure 
accuracy.  
The following research question guided this study.  
Research Question  
What is the relationship between education levels and public opinion on foreign 
policy issues covered extensively by the news media during periods of crisis such as 
before the Iraq War?  
The following five hypotheses were formulated to help answer this research 
question by examining various aspects of public opinion before the Iraq War. 
H01A. There is no significant difference in public opinion opposing economic 
sanctions on Iraq by the United States based on education levels. 
Ha1A. There is significant difference in public opinion opposing economic 
sanctions on Iraq by the United States based on education levels. 
H01B. There is no significant difference in public opinion rating combating 
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international terrorism as a United States foreign policy goal based on education levels. 
Ha1B. There is significant difference public opinion rating combating international 
terrorism as a United States foreign policy goal based on education levels. 
H01C. There is no significant difference in public opinion regarding if Iraq will 
develop weapons of mass destruction based on education levels. 
Ha1C. There is significant difference in public opinion regarding if Iraq will 
develop weapons of mass destruction based on education levels. 
H01D. There is no significant difference in public opinion of favoring or opposing 
the use of U.S. troops if Iraq invaded Saudi Arabia based on education levels.  
Ha1D. There is significant difference in public opinion on favoring or opposing 
the use of U.S. troops if Iraq invaded Saudi Arabia based on education levels. 
H01E. There is no significant difference in public opinion on using U.S. troops to 
invade and overthrow the government of Saddam Hussein/Iraq based on education levels.  
Ha1E. There is significant difference in public opinion on using United States 
troops to invade and overthrow Saddam Hussein/Iraq based on education levels. 
I performed binomial logistic regression to test on all of the hypotheses. At least two 
variables are needed to use binomial logistic regression (Laerd Statistics, 2015). To 
determine if the data were appropriate for binomial logistic regression analysis, I 
specifically tested to ensure a linear relationship existed. Binomial logistic regression 
makes four key assumptions: (1) that dependent variables are measured by means of a 
dichotomous scale; (2) independent variables must be continuous or categorical; (3) 
independence of observations, as well as mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories; 
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(4) linear relationship between the independent variable and logistic change of the 
dependent variables (Laerd Statistics, 2015; Pampel, 2000). Laerd Statistics (2015) 
suggested checking the assumptions in the order listed, because if a violation of the 
assumptions exist, and are not correctable, binomial logistic regression cannot be used.  
I searched for multicollinearity to ensure the hypotheses were accurately plotted 
(Vogt & Johnson, 2011). Because each regression model had more than one variable, 
there existed the likelihood of multicollinearity. If there is a high probability of 
correlation, it will be difficult to discern their distinct effects on the dependent variable 
(Li, 2011; Vogt & Johnson, 2011). Once I determined that the data met the assumptions 
of binomial logistic, I tested my five hypotheses with the same independent variable 
(education level), and each of the five dependent variables. All models also included five 
covariates (ideology; sex; race; income level and political party) to control for 
demographic factors that could influence public opinion.   
I performed alpha-level testing to conclude if each of the null hypotheses were to 
be rejected (Vogt & Johnson, 2011). Each H0 were rejected for p-values less than α, 
otherwise, the p-value was represented (Gill, 1999). The alpha error level was p < .05 to 
minimize Type I errors (Moyé, 2003). 
Threats to Validity 
 Validity is the quality and accuracy of data, indicating the strength of the research 
design, while threats to external validity are applying the research to other studies (Vogt 
& Johnson, 2011). Further, threats to validity “can lead to false conclusions” (Vogt & 
Johnson, 2011, p. 399). Because the data was of a secondary nature from the American 
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Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy (2002), external threats to validity were 
minimized due to the original study utilizing random participants that appear to be an 
accurate representation of the population. The original survey data was part of a 
quadrennial study by a reputable research organization. Further, maturation is limited or 
non-existent, since the respondents of the original survey are not being tested except for 
opinions during a given thirty-day period. Developers of the study did not indicate what 
percentages of the telephone interviews were conducted via a landline vs. cellphone. 
There is concern that data could be skewed toward older citizens who prefer landline 
phones versus younger citizens who prefer cell phones. There was also concern that the 
study was not completed just by those who were willing to answer the survey. It was 
taken at face value that Harris Interactive did an effective job of obtaining a 
representative sample, given the inherent limits of telephone polling. 
The original study was conducted in June 2002, examining public opinion and 
attitudes of the general public. This study determined if education affected agenda-setting 
despite the repetition of the message before the Iraq War. Generalizability is the degree 
by which outcomes from the sample of the study are characteristic of results obtained 
from the study’s overall population (Furr, 2011). The findings of this study may not be 
generalizable to public opinion on foreign affairs in all situations, such as when low-
messaging is present. Findings should be generalizable to foreign affairs where high-
messaging is present. 
There exists an internal threat to the results of the study because validity about the 
repetition of the message cannot be measured. However, the Bush administration citation 
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of links to Iraq complicit in the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, as justification 
for the invasion was perpetuated by the news media. The news media continued the 
narrative that Hussein was involved in some capacity to the terrorist attacks was repeated 
continually, which aided in changing public opinion about Hussein, Iraq and the 
subsequent justification for invasion. News coverage of the lead-up to the invasion of 
Iraq was available in a variety of sources that it is probable individuals in the United 
States were exposed to this messaging. It was impossible to quantify the messaging due 
to each person’s unique news media ingestion, but it is unlikely that individuals over the 
age of 18 in the United States participating in public opinion polls were not aware of 
news media messaging.  
Ethical Procedures  
 Because the nature of the secondary data derived from the American Public 
Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy survey of 2002, ethical concerns are minimized and 
negligible. The survey available had no identifying information; therefore, no ethical 
concerns were present for participants in the survey. The original ICPSR 3673 code book 
cited that any inadvertent identification of individuals was discouraged and should be 
reported to ICPSR. Also, the data was be double-checked for errors and the presence of 
identifiable information. Any identifiable information was corrected before testing in 
accordance with Walden University IRB standards, as well as reported to David Krane 
and Shawn Wade, the Project Managers on Inter-University Consortium for Political and 
Social Research Study Number 3673 per their request (Chicago Council on Foreign 
Relations, 2002). The Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research 
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dataset was available on the website of ICPSR to an affiliated organization, such as 
Walden University, and was not confidential data. After IRB approval, the data was 
downloaded from ICPSR, secured, stored and password protected within my Dropbox 
account, as well as my PC for five years, and then it will be destroyed from my personal 
files using an overwrite erase software. 
Summary 
In Chapter 3, I examined the dataset to be used, the methodology, and design for 
the study. I proposed a quantitative, correlative study using binomial logistic regression 
that would determine the extent education levels had upon public opinion before the Iraq 
War, with assumed repetition of message. I drew the data from ICPSR Study Number 
3673 (Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 2002), and used statistical analysis to 
predict public opinion of a general population. 
The variables I used were determined by their relative association to the research 
question and the hypotheses. My study used one independent variable (higher education 
level), five covariates (ideology; sex; race; income level; and political party), which were 
expected to have an effect on the ability to affect agenda-setting, and five dependent 
variables (favoring economic sanctions against Iraq; combating international terrorism as 
a foreign policy goal; Iraq developing weapons of mass destruction in the next 10 years; 
favor or oppose the use of U.S. troops if Iraq invaded Saudi Arabia; and, support for the 




Detailed statistical analysis and survey results of the study are presented in 
Chapter 4. I will documentand presentany found discrepancies in data collection. I will 





Chapter 4: Results 
Introduction 
The purpose of this quantitative study was to determine if there was a relationship 
between education level attainment and public opinion before the Iraq War started. I used 
secondary data to answer the following research question: what is the relationship 
between education levels and public opinion on foreign policy issues covered extensively 
by the news media during periods of crisis such as before the Iraq War? I tested five 
hypotheses independently, using binomial logistic regression.  
In this chapter, I will discuss the data collection and the results of my study. I will 
discuss how I procured the data, and the methods I used to clean and recode. I restate the 
research question that guided this study, as well as the hypotheses used to help answer 
this research question. This chapter will detail the descriptive statistics and the analysis 
process used in this study. Finally, I will summarize the results and transition to Chapter 
5. 
Data 
I used a secondary dataset in my study. My data use was approved by the Walden 
IRB. Once Walden IRB granted permission to retrieve the ICPSR dataset (approval #07-
27-17-0197654) it was downloaded from ICPSR’s website and imported into SPSS 24 for 
analysis.  
Descriptive Statistics 
Preliminary testing by means of frequency analysis and descriptive statistics was 
used to observe a basic summary of the data. The frequencies check ensured there were 
61 
 
no missing data fields in the data set and I recoded any missing variables by inputting a 
value of 99. Any case with a missing value in the variables of interest were omitted from 
the analysis. I recoded the data containing independent variables and covariates to ensure 
normal distribution was present to prepare it for statistical analysis. As a result of the 
missing data, the sample size was for testing hypothesis 1 was 656, 1100 for hypothesis 
2, 1108 for hypothesis 3, 1034 for hypothesis 4, and 656 for hypothesis 5. I determined 
the mean, median, and mode of the independent variable of education levels, as well as 
for each of the five dependent variables: economic sanctions against Iraq, international 
terrorism, Iraq will develop WMDs, U.S. troops if Iraq invaded Saudi Arabia, and 
overthrow Saddam Hussein/Iraq (See Table 2). In addition, I also determined the mean, 
median and mode of each of the five covariates: ideology, sex, race, income level, and 









Descriptive Statistics – All Variables 
 
Independent Variable 
 Min Max Mean SD 
Education 0 5 3.19 1.197 
 
Dependent Variable 
    
Economic sanctions against Iraq 0 1 .74 .437 
International Terrorism 0 1 .91 .284 
Iraq will develop WMDs 0 1 .86 .346 
U.S. troops if Iraq invaded S. Arabia 0 1 .52 .500 
Overthrow Saddam Hussein/Iraq 0 1 .73 .446 
 
Covariates 
    
Ideology 0 4 2.20 1.033 
Sex 0 1 .50 .500 
Race 0 1 .17 .377 
Income level 0 10 3.30 2.157 
Political Party 0 1 .510 .500 
 
The original ICPSR 3673 dataset was a national probability sample, ensuring 
respondents represented a general cross-section of individuals 18 years and older living in 
the United States. Since the original dataset was generalized, its use as a secondary data 
should also be generalizable to the U.S. population. While population shifts occur, the 
most notable shift between the 2000 and 2010 Census’ indicated a 43% increase in the 
Hispanic population, and 97% of the total U.S. population identified as a single race 
(2010 Census, 2011). Since the original data was collected in June 2002, two years after 
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the 2000 Census and eight years prior to the 2010 Census, it is then reasonable to believe 
that the data is still generalizable to American public opinion. 
Assumption Testing 
Laerd Statistics (2015) clarified that the assumptions for binomial logistic 
regression are met if there is an independence of observations, the dependent variable is 
dichotomous and ordinal, and the independent variable mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive. There must be one or more independent variables that are measured as 
continuous or nominal. Laerd (2015) also stated, “there must be a linear relationship 
between the independent variable and the logit transformation of the dependent variable,” 
and “data must not show multicollinearity” (p. 5). It is necessary that the dataset must not 
violate the assumptions of binomial logistic regression, or missing data. 
In each of the dependent variables, the assumption of independence of 
observations was met, as each variable was dichotomous and ordinal. I had one 
independent variable, education level, which was continuous, measuring level of 
education attainment, thereby meeting the assumption of the independent variable. I 
tested for multicollinearity by performing multiple regression looking at variance 
inflation factors (VIF). I determined that the highest VIF values were within tolerance 
thresholds and are annotated within each variable. The necessary statistical assumptions 
regarding each variable were fulfilled prior to analysis. Significance was accepted at .05.  
To determine linearity and non-linearity, binomial analyses were performed to 
test assumptions of the model for each dependent variable. An analysis of the dependent 
variable, independent variable and the covariates were performed and were normally 
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distributed at (n = 1,008, μ = .74, s = .437). The independent variable, education levels, 
which remained constant regardless of dependent variable, distributed at (n = 3,254, μ = 
3.19, s = 1.197). Rating dependent variable combating international terrorism as a United 
States foreign policy goal, an analysis of the dependent variable, independent variable, 
and the covariates were performed and were normally distributed at (n = 1,100, μ = .91, s 
= .284). The dependent variable regarding if Iraq will develop weapons of mass 
destruction, an analysis of the dependent variable, independent variable, and the 
covariates were performed and were normally distributed at (n = 1,108, μ = .86, s = .346). 
Favoring or opposing the use of U.S. troops if Iraq invaded Saudi Arabia, an analysis of 
the dependent variable, independent variable, and the covariates were performed and 
were normally distributed at (n = 1,034, μ = .52, s = .5). Concerning the use of U.S. 
troops to invade and overthrow the government of Saddam Hussein/Iraq, an analysis of 
the dependent variable, independent variable, and the covariates were performed and 
were normally distributed at (n = 656, μ = .73, s = .446). The assumption testing proved 
acceptable, as there were no violations. Because the assumption criterion were met, I 
moved forward using SPSS version 24 to test the five hypotheses using binomial logistic 
regression.  
Results 
The following research question guided this study: what is the relationship 
between education levels and public opinion on foreign policy issues covered extensively 
by the news media during periods of crisis such as before the Iraq War? The null 
hypotheses associated with the research question presumed that there was no significant 
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difference in public opinion on a dependent variable affecting education levels. I 
evaluated the significance of the variables to either accept or reject the null hypotheses.  
H01A. There is no significant difference in public opinion opposing economic 
sanctions on Iraq by the United States based on education levels. 
I used binomial logistic regression to ascertain the effects of ideology, sex, race, 
income level, and political party on the respondent’s opinions rating public opinion 
opposing economic sanctions on Iraq by the United States based on education levels. The 
measure of the dependent variable is nominal and dichotomous. The VIF ranged between 
1.038 and 1.402 on all six variables. The Hosmer and Lemeshow test indicated a good fit 
of p = .462. Linearity of the continuous variables with respect to the logit of the 
dependent variable was addressed via the Box-Tidwell (1962) procedure. A Bonferonni 
correction was applied using all terms in the model resulting in statistical significance 
being accepted when p < .00625. Of the six predictor variables only one was statistically 
significant: political party (as shown in Table 3). All other variables were not statistically 
significant from baseline. Because significance for the education levels variable was not 
high enough to accept the alternative hypothesis, I accepted the null hypothesis, that there 
is no significant difference in public opinion opposing economic sanctions on Iraq by the 







Favoring or opposing economic sanctions against Iraq 
 
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 95% C.I. for 
EXP(B) 
       Lower Upper 
Education .134 .082 2.705 1 .100 1.144 .975 1.343 
Ideology .074 .098 .561 1 .454 1.076 .888 1.305 
Sex -.059 .184 .104 1 .748 .942 .656 1.353 
Race -.195 .245 .635 1 .425 .823 .509 1.329 
Income .064 .049 1.740 1 .187 1.066 .969 1.173 
Political Party -.651 .212 9.408 1 .002 .522 .344 .791 
Ha1B. There is a significant difference public opinion rating combating 
international terrorism as a United States foreign policy goal based on education levels. 
I used binomial logistic regression to ascertain the effects of ideology, sex, race, 
income level, and political party on the respondent’s opinions rating combating 
international terrorism as a United States foreign policy goal. The measure of the 
dependent variable is ordinal and dichotomous. The VIF ranged between 1.044 and 1.333 
on all six variables. The Hosmer and Lemeshow test indicated a good fit of p = .313. 
Linearity of the continuous variables with respect to the logit of the dependent variable 
was addressed via the Box-Tidwell (1962) procedure. A Bonferonni correction was 
applied using all terms in the model resulting in statistical significance being accepted 
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when p < .00625. Of the six predictor variables only one was statistically significant: 
education level (as shown in Table 4). All other variables were not statistically significant 
from baseline. Based on these findings, I rejected the null hypothesis, as there is a 
significant difference public opinion rating combating international terrorism as a United 
States foreign policy goal based on education levels. 
Table 4 
 
Opinions rating combating international terrorism as a United States foreign policy goal 
 
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 95% C.I. for 
EXP(B) 
       Lower Upper 
Education -.312 .128 5.985 1 .014 .732 .570 .940 
Ideology .105 .138 .577 1 .447 1.111 .847 1.457 
Sex .424 .275 2.374 1 .123 1.528 .891 2.621 
Race -.560 .303 3.419 1 .064 .571 .315 1.034 
Income .106 .074 2.037 1 .153 1.112 .961 1.287 
Political Party -.311 .321 .937 1 .333 .733 .391 1.375 
H01C. There is no significant difference in public opinion regarding if Iraq will 
develop weapons of mass destruction based on education levels. 
I used binomial logistic regression to ascertain the effects of ideology, sex, race, 
income level, and political party on the respondent’s opinions regarding if Iraq will 
develop weapons of mass destruction. The measure of the dependent variable is ordinal 
and dichotomous. The VIF ranged between 1.041 and 1.329 on all six variables. The 
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Hosmer and Lemeshow test indicated a good fit of p = .634. Linearity of the continuous 
variables with respect to the logit of the dependent variable was addressed via the Box-
Tidwell (1962) procedure. A Bonferonni correction was applied using all terms in the 
model resulting in statistical significance being accepted when p < .00625. Of the six 
predictor variables only one was statistically significant: sex (as shown in Table 5). All 
other variables were not statistically significant from baseline. Based on these findings, I 
accepted the null hypothesis, that there is no significant difference in public opinion 
regarding if Iraq will develop weapons of mass destruction based on education levels. 
Table 5 
 
Opinions regarding if Iraq will develop weapons of mass destruction 
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 95% C.I. for 
EXP(B) 
       Lower Upper 
Education -.108 .096 1.269 1 .260 .897 .744 1.083 
Ideology -.075 .115 .424 1 .515 .928 .740 1.163 
Sex .930 .228 16.662 1 .000 2.534 1.621 3.959 
Race .204 .311 .431 1 .512 1.226 .667 2.253 
Income .103 .058 3.105 1 .078 1.108 .989 1.243 
Political Party -.002 .488 .000 1 .995 .998 .614 1.622 
H01D. There is no significant difference in public opinion of favoring or opposing 
the use of U.S. troops if Iraq invaded Saudi Arabia based on education levels.  
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I used binomial logistic regression to ascertain the effects of ideology, sex, race, 
income level, and political party on the respondent’s opinions on favoring or opposing 
the use of U.S. troops if Iraq invaded Saudi Arabia. The measure of the dependent 
variable is nominal and dichotomous. The VIF ranged between 1.048 and 1.451 on all six 
variables. The Hosmer and Lemeshow test indicated a good fit of p = .084. Linearity of 
the continuous variables with respect to the logit of the dependent variable was addressed 
via the Box-Tidwell (1962) procedure. A Bonferonni correction was applied using all 
terms in the model resulting in statistical significance being accepted when p < .00625. 
Of the six predictor variables only one was statistically significant: sex (as shown in 
Table 6). All other variables were not statistically significant from baseline. Based on 
these findings, I accepted the null hypothesis, that there is no significant difference in 
public opinion of favoring or opposing the use of U.S. troops if Iraq invaded Saudi 






Opinions of favoring or opposing the use of U.S. troops if Iraq invaded Saudi Arabia 
 
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 95% C.I. for 
EXP(B) 
       Lower Upper 
Education .106 .069 2.355 1 .125 1.112 .971 1.274 
Ideology .127 .085 2.242 1 .134 1.135 .962 1.341 
Sex .435 .156 7.808 1 .005 .647 .477 .878 
Race -.284 .215 1.752 1 .186 .753 .494 1.146 
Income .027 .041 .432 1 .511 1.027 .948 1.112 
Political Party -.118 .183 .418 1 .518 .889 .621 1.271 
Ha1E. There is a significant difference in public opinion on using United States 
troops to invade and overthrow Saddam Hussein/Iraq based on education levels. 
I used binomial logistic regression to ascertain the effects of ideology, sex, race, 
income level, and political party on the respondent’s opinions favoring or opposing the 
support for the United States using troops to overthrow Saddam Hussein’s government. 
The measure of the dependent variable is nominal and dichotomous. The VIF ranged 
between 1.048 and 1.446 on all six variables. The Hosmer and Lemeshow test indicated a 
good fit of p = .002. Linearity of the continuous variables with respect to the logit of the 
dependent variable was addressed via the Box-Tidwell (1962) procedure. A Bonferonni 
correction was applied using all terms in the model resulting in statistical significance 
being accepted when p < .00625. Of the six predictor variables, three were statistically 
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significant: education, ideology, and political party (as shown in Table 7). All other 
variables were not statistically significant from baseline. Based on these findings, I reject 
the null hypothesis, as there is a significant difference in public opinion on using United 
States troops to invade and overthrow Saddam Hussein/Iraq based on education levels.  
Table 7 
 
Opinions on using United States troops to invade and overthrow Saddam Hussein/Iraq 
 
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 95% C.I. for EXP(B) 
       Lower Upper 
Education -.439 .108 16.535 1 .000 .645 .522 .797 
Ideology .305 .123 6.146 1 .013 1.357 1.066 1.727 
Sex .009 .221 .002 1 .969 1.009 .655 1.554 
Race -.319 .263 1.474 1 .225 .727 .434 1.216 
Income .024 .054 .199 1 .656 1.025 .921 1.140 
Political Party -1.118 .268 17.464 1 .000 .327 .193 .552 
Summary 
The research question that guided my research was what is the relationship 
between education levels and public opinion on foreign policy issues covered extensively 
by the news media during periods of crisis such as before the Iraq War? In testing the five 
hypotheses, I rejected the null hypothesis for two: there is a significant difference in 
public opinion combating international terrorism as a United States foreign policy goal 
based on education levels; and there is a significant difference in public opinion on using 
United States troops to invade and overthrow Saddam Hussein/Iraq based on education 
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levels. Three null hypotheses were accepted: there is no significant difference in public 
opinion opposing economic sanctions on Iraq by the United States based on education 
levels; there is no significant difference in public opinion regarding if Iraq will develop 
weapons of mass destruction based on education levels; and there is no significant 
difference in public opinion of favoring or opposing the use of U.S. troops if Iraq invaded 
Saudi Arabia based on education levels. While a majority of the hypotheses could not 
reject the null hypotheses, with a margin of 3-to-2, in some cases, education levels had 
influenced public opinion prior to the Iraq War. 
In this chapter, I detailed the data collection and procedures used for analysis. In 
Chapter 5, I will interpret my findings, discuss their implication on public policy and 




Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
Introduction 
The purpose of this quantitative study was to examine the relationship between 
education levels and public opinion on foreign policy issues covered extensively by the 
news media during periods of crisis such as before the Iraq War using McCombs’s 
(2004/2014) agenda-setting theory. I used secondary data from ICPSR Study 3673 which 
was originally conducted in June 2002. I used the covariates of ideology, sex, race, 
income level, and political party to control for influence on the independent variable of 
education levels. The dependent variables were: favoring economic sanctions against 
Iraq; combating international terrorism as a foreign policy goal, Iraq developing weapons 
of mass destruction in the next 10 years, favor or oppose the use of U.S. troops if Iraq 
invaded Saudi Arabia, and support for the United States using troops to invade Iraq and 
overthrow the government of Saddam Hussein. 
In this study I analyzed the effect education levels have on public opinion using 
binomial logistic regression analysis, and accepted the null hypotheses of three of the five 
hypotheses presented. Not all of the hypotheses were nullified; I demonstrated that 
education levels can have an influence on public opinion on two of the five hypotheses.  
This chapter includes an interpretations of the findings and the limitations of the 
study. I will conclude the chapter with recommendations for future research and policy 
implications for positive social change. 
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Interpretation of the Findings 
While there has been research devoted to agenda-setting, types of news media 
consumption, and post-September 11, 2001, this research extended study on the effects of 
education levels on public opinion. Research on the impact of news media on foreign 
policy is limited (Eissler, Russell, & Jones, 2014). Further, studies on the effects of 
repetitious news media during crisis have been nonexistent up to this point. This study 
links agenda-setting, education, and repetition during a foreign affairs crisis. 
Understanding the effects of education levels on public opinion is important, as it 
is known to stabilize the political opinions of those with higher education compared to 
their less educated counterparts (Converse, 1964/2006; Zaller, 1991). Higher education is 
a means to combat political propaganda but not as effective in an uncompetitive news 
media environment (Johansen & Joslyn, 2008). The effect of higher education on public 
opinion may have important ramifications for news media consumption. My research 
aided in closing the gap by determining that, depending on the particular issue, education 
levels were influential upon public opinion during a foreign affairs crisis when there is 
repetitious and uniform media coverage, such as before the Iraq War. 
Education level is not always a predictor of opinion. I found that higher education 
was not a significant predictor in public opinion opposing economic sanctions on Iraq by 
the United States, if Iraq will develop weapons of mass destruction, and favoring or 
opposing the use of U.S. troops if Iraq invaded Saudi Arabia. However, in some cases, I 
found that higher education levels were a significant predictor of public opinion. The 
instances where higher education played a significant role were combating international 
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terrorism as a United States foreign policy goal and using United States troops to invade 
and overthrow Saddam Hussein/Iraq. In testing international terrorism as a United States 
foreign policy goal as a dependent variable, only education levels were a significant 
predictor variable. The significance was .014 and the Exp(B) was .732. In some specific 
foreign policies, it appears that opinions about combating international terrorism may 
have been more significant due the fact that those with more education grasp politics and 
its consequences more than the less educated (Campbell, 2013). 
I also found education levels a significant predictor of opinions on the topic of 
using United States troops to invade and overthrow Saddam Hussein/Iraq. Education 
levels were highly significant at .000 and the Exp(B) was .645. Ideology and political 
party also showed significant prediction of using United States troops to overthrow 
Saddam Hussein/Iraq. Those identifying with the Democratic political party, and who 
considered themselves very liberal ideologically had the lowest favorability of favoring 
an overthrow of Hussein/Iraq with 5.5%. The closest statistical landmark was that of the 
far right, very conservative, which held at 10.1%. In fact, those who considered 
themselves fairly liberal were only 17.6% likely to favor an overthrow of Hussein/Iraq. 
Ideology was significant at .013 and an Exp(B) of 1.357. Political party was highly 
significant at .000 and an Exp(B) of .327. Further, the overthrow hypothesis details that 
there was significantly less support for the overthrow of Saddam Hussein/Iraq amongst 
those with higher education levels. The Bush administration was accused of intentionally 
misusing gathered intelligence, and disregarded information from the intelligence 
community that did not fit the narrative that justified the invasion of Iraq to the United 
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Nations, as well as to American citizens (Fox, 2006; Pincus, 2006; van der Heide, 2013). 
Because the initial invasion was tied to the overthrow of Hussein/Iraq through the use of 
a preemptive strike, and a subsequent war, perhaps of the five hypotheses, this was the 
most important.   
I used McCombs (2004/2014) agenda-setting theory as the foundation for the 
study. McCombs (2004/2014) stated that the coverage of the news media becomes what 
individuals then wish to see regarding topics of the day. This coverage loop then becomes 
an increased salience of topic and stored in long-term memory (McCombs, 2004/2014). 
Zaller (1992) stated that an individual pulls information from the sources they have 
readily available. In this case, most Americans derive their knowledge of politics and 
current events from the news media. Rampton and Stauber (2003) indicated that 
repetitious messaging can promote false narratives. Research has shown that repetition 
reinforces memory, the recall of message, and subsequently influences future action 
(Brown & Nix, 1996; Dubuisson, et al., 2012; Lakoff, 2006; Rampton & Stauber, 2003; 
Saville, 2011; Schreiber et al., 2013). Consumption of repeated of media messaging is 
assumed in this study. If the news media is providing false equivalency, erroneous 
information, or biased coverage of events, this perspective is then set into the 
consciousness of the news consumer. The susceptibility of news media consumers to 
agenda-setting has been well documented (McCombs, 1967; McCombs & Weaver, 1973; 
Tolman, 1932; Weaver, 1991; Westley & Borrow, 1959). McCombs (2004/2014) 
indicating that the greater the increased salience of topic, the more profound an impact on 
public opinion. The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, subsequent conversations about 
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blaming Iraq, and the talk of potential war with Iraq, may have been the most covered 
news story of the past century, and increased salience of topic was not only high, but 
inescapable.  
There were a few interesting insights in examining the data per the relationship 
between education levels and public opinion on foreign policy issues covered extensively 
by the news media during periods of crisis such as before the Iraq War. The results 
showed that perhaps some of the fears being driven by the media repetitiously prior to the 
Iraq War might have driven the three null hypotheses that there is no significant 
difference in public opinion opposing economic sanctions on Iraq by the United States 
based on education levels, there is no significant difference in public opinion regarding if 
Iraq will develop weapons of mass destruction based on education levels, and there is no 
significant difference in public opinion of favoring or opposing the use of U.S. troops if 
Iraq invaded Saudi Arabia based on education levels.  
As these were highly reported stories in the time prior to the Iraq War, it is 
possible that agenda-setting played a significant role in altering public opinion. This 
research links agenda-setting, education, and public opinion, especially during times of 
war, and crisis with high repetition. 
Limitations of the Study 
The limitations of this study were consistent with those described in Chapter 1. 
While there were some missing data, no compromises to the analysis were necessary. 
Because the data were secondary, no known internal risks to validity exist. Further, 
external risks are minimal or nonexistent, as the survey data were part of a quadrennial 
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study in June 2002 by a reputable research organization, there was a reasonable 
expectation that the sampling was of high quality. I found nothing that made me question 
the validity or quality of their original work. Therefore, the trustworthiness, validity, and 
reliability of the ICPSR Study 3673 were valid. 
My study was limited by the by the steps taken by the original researchers in 
collecting the data. Any personal biases I may have had were eliminated through the use 
of standard statistical methods and the use of secondary data, because I did not participate 
in collecting. Despite any limitations, this study provides insight into agenda-setting, 
education, and repetition and their effect on public opinion. 
Recommendations 
I examined the relationship between education levels and public opinion on 
foreign policy issues covered extensively by the news media during periods of crisis such 
as before the Iraq War. I assumed the repetition of news media messaging was present. 
Agenda-setting leads to the repetition of news media messages. The Iraq War began over 
15 years ago, and the September 11, 2001 and terrorist attacks slightly longer ago. In that 
period, the United States has seen news media proliferation and changes in media 
distribution, as well as consumption.  
Johansen and Joslyn (2008) and Kull et al. (2003) identified problems with 
viewership during the lead-up to the Iraq War; biased news coverage from CBS and Fox 
News caused viewers in an uncompetitive news media environment to be misinformed 
about facts surrounding Iraq. Further, even as the Iraq War was nearing its end, Fox 
News proved a predictor for support for the war, while non-Fox News programs proved 
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insignificant predictors of support for war (Lin, 2009). Research indicated that false 
information that is repeated is just as accepted as factual information (Arkes, Hackett, & 
Boehm, 1989; Bacon, 1979; Begg, Anas, & Farinacci, 1992; Begg & Armour, 1991; 
Begg, Armour, & Kerr, 1985; Brown & Nix, 1996; Gigerenzer, 1984; Hasher et al., 1977; 
Rampton & Stauber, 2003); Schwartz, 1982). Brown and Nix (1996) determined that if 
false, repetitious information is not corrected immediately, it becomes truth to the viewer. 
Vosoughi, Roy, and Aral (2018) found that political stories were spread faster and farther 
than any other type of news story. Biased news media coverage may circumvent 
education, as inaccurate and misrepresented stories create flawed understandings of 
complex events. Holding the news media accountable so that they remain unbiased and 
deliver factual information to their audience is an ongoing consideration. A new 
consideration is that of social media providers and their part in fake news proliferation or 
mitigation. 
In order to further understand how public opinion is shaped by repetitious news 
media messaging, especially during periods of crisis such as before the Iraq War, more 
study is needed. Eissler, Russell and Jones (2014) determined that research on the effect 
of news media on foreign policy is limited. Further studies might include asking 
respondents about specific news sources, their media consumption habits, including their 
preferences of method of viewing said news media, if they remember hearing or reading 
the story more than a determined amount of times, and using a journal to document their 
media habits. By asking the respondents more specific questions about the media, usage 
and acknowledgement of repetitious messaging, a more complete picture could be 
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ascertained. An additional area of study could be conducted by a researcher wishing to 
determine the outcome from news stories that were purposefully manipulated in an 
intervention group and observe differences of opinion based upon education levels. 
Another area of interest that may prove significant is a study of education levels 
broken down by fields of general study and the effect each have on a significant public 
opinion event, such as war, environmental concerns, or foreign policy. Such research 
could indicate if some schools of academic thought teach or attract individuals who are 
more or perhaps less resilient to disinformation strategies, propaganda techniques, or 
control mechanisms than others, as an example. This hierarchy of education level fields 
with deference to agenda-setting and political propaganda studies would be of significant 
value to academics.  
Implications 
This research aided in closing the gap in the literature concerning the impact of 
education levels on public opinion during a foreign affairs crisis when there is repetitious 
and uniform media coverage, such as before the Iraq War. While education has had the 
benefit of informing better opinions (Makowsky & Miller, 2014) and stabilizing political 
opinions (Converse, 1964/2006; Zaller, 1991), the effect of education levels in response 
to agenda-setting has been unknown. Repetition of messages by the news media may also 
increase the effectiveness of agenda-setting, which may perpetuate inaccurate, 
misleading, or false information. Normally, education is a barrier to negative aspects of 
repetition and agenda-setting, but this may not be the case in periods of crisis, affecting 
public opinion on foreign affairs. 
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An implication of positive social change is through the betterment of public 
policy by improving an understanding of how public opinion is formed, thereby 
improving policy initiatives. Research shows that political knowledge is a predictor of 
voting behavior (Delli Capini & Keeter, 1996; Popkin & Dimock, 1999). Not every 
citizen is a candidate for or wishes to pursue higher education. Nor is higher education 
for everyone viable or probable. Civics knowledge is an efficient means to instill interest 
in government and citizenship. 
Civics courses in K-12 education used to prepare young citizens for the 
complexities of domestic and foreign policy, as well as their rights, obligations, and 
duties in American society. These courses had substantial value in discourse, having a 
lasting effect on their political interests and involvement. Since their eradication in recent 
decades (Civics Education Testing, 2012), there are few states that still offer these civics 
programs, with more of an increased educational policy focusing on work skills for 
graduates (Dillon, 2011). The lack of civics knowledge causes problems with the 
fundamental understanding of American diplomacy and security, as well as leaving the 
citizens open for mental high jacking by news media or disinformation strategies. In lieu 
of higher education, or a desire to self-educate, civics coursework is necessary for the 
active citizenry. The decline of civics courses comes as individuals shift their focus from 
news media sources to social networking sites, putting American citizens at risk for 
misinformation. Social media disinformation strategies have increased since the 2016 
Presidential Election (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017; Rogers & Engel Bromwich, 2016; 
Solon, 2016a). During that period, there were many sources of disinformation that 
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changed public opinion leading up to the outcome of the election, being widely reported 
as the hacking of Democracy. Research indicated that political stories were spread 6 
times faster than any other type of news story (Vosoughi, Roy, & Aral, 2018). These 
false news sources may become more incumbent to mitigate in the future, as social media 
disinformation strategies affect perceptions of domestic and foreign issues. Informed 
citizenry is an important characteristic of democracy.  
If citizens are not engaged in actively participating in the process of being 
informed and informing their elected representatives of their needs, elected officials may 
simply enact their own agendas. This is not to say that all elected officials will listen to 
their constituents and represent them accordingly, but they are held more accountable by 
citizens who are educated on topics than those who are not. Further, education can only 
be mandated at the K-12 level. By the time an individual reaches the voting age without 
being educated on domestic and foreign policy at a university, their chances of learning 
this information independently is probably negligible. It becomes necessary to not only 
teach children the intricacies of civics in K-12, but the earlier, the better. Research shows 
that learning civics at an early age sticks with individuals longer, preparing them for 
lifelong involvement (Feldman, 2007). Further, early lessons would aid young children in 
the understanding of their government, the news media, and how to spot disinformation 
campaigns easier. Americans stand to benefit from more active citizenry, should the 
educational systems reinstitute civics courses. In absence of civics lessons, teaching 
children how to become more aware of media messaging, as well as how to self-inform, 
to guard against messaging that may alter their perceptions in deleterious ways. A 
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reinstitution of civics coursework in K-12 education helps protect Americans and 
American interests from misinformation, propaganda, and control. 
Not only is it important that the citizens desire an understanding of how 
government works, but it is incumbent of legislative bodies to protect not only their 
constituents, but also the very constructs of government which they serve. Perhaps 
nothing is more important to positive social change as ensuring citizens are fully aware of 
how their participation, volunteerism, activism, running for public office, and voting 
affect their communities, as well as their ability to understand the news media around 
them. My research indicated education levels had some significance in altering public 
opinion on foreign policy issues covered extensively by the news media during periods of 
crisis such as before the Iraq War. War may or may not be generalizable to other high 
frequency events, however, it is certainly generalizable to potential future conflict.  
Conclusion 
My research indicated that education levels may be, in certain instances, linked to 
public opinion on foreign policy issues covered extensively by the news media during 
periods of crisis, such as before the Iraq War. Further research is needed to determine if 
there are other areas that are tangential, but it is clear that education does play at least 
some significant role in public opinion on foreign policy. The areas in which education 
did conclusively have significance may not prove the value of education but verify its 
role in civic discourse. Individuals obtaining higher education are likely to have a better 
understanding of government, policy, media, and public opinion than their less educated 
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counterparts, even those with civics lessons within their K-12 education, but something is 
better than nothing. 
There were a few interesting insights in examining the data per the relationship 
between education levels and public opinion on foreign policy issues covered extensively 
by the news media during periods of crisis such as before the Iraq War. The results 
showed that perhaps some of the fears being driven by the news media repetitiously prior 
to the Iraq War might have driven the three null hypotheses that were accepted: there is 
no significant difference in public opinion opposing economic sanctions on Iraq by the 
United States based on education levels; there is no significant difference in public 
opinion regarding if Iraq will develop weapons of mass destruction based on education 
levels; and there is no significant difference in public opinion of favoring or opposing the 
use of U.S. troops if Iraq invaded Saudi Arabia based on education levels. 
As each of these topics were talking points well reported by the news media prior 
to the Iraq War, it is possible that agenda-setting played a significant role in altering 
public opinion. The results showed that in some instances, higher education played a 
significant role in public opinion prior to the Iraq War by the alternate hypotheses that 
were accepted: there is a significant difference public opinion rating combating 
international terrorism as a United States foreign policy goal based on education levels; 
and there is a significant difference in public opinion on using United States troops to 
invade and overthrow Saddam Hussein/Iraq based on education levels. 
This research links McCombs’s (2004/2014) theory of agenda-setting, education, 
repetition, and public opinion, especially during times of war, and crisis with high 
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repetition present. Further research of agenda-setting in these specific conditions may 
determine to what degree, and when higher education mitigates the effects of repeititious 
political propaganda. Lastly, such reseach may indicate what areas of study could be 
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Appendix A: Operational Definitions Full Text from the original Survey used by ICPSR 
Study Number 3673 (Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 2002). 
Question 
number 
Variables GSS code Survey question Measure 
 Independent    
Q1002/96  
 




 Dependent    
Q675/2 Favoring economic 
sanctions against Iraq 
SANCTIONS 
 
Do you favor or oppose the use 
of economic sanctions against 









I am going to read you a list of 
possible foreign policy threats 
that the United States might 
have. For each one please say 
whether you think that it should 
be a very important foreign 
policy goal of the United States, 
a somewhat important foreign 
policy goal, or not an important 
goal at all. First, how important a 
foreign policy goal should 
combating international 
terrorism [be]?  
 
Dichotomous 
Q530/19 Iraq developing 
weapons of mass 
destruction in the next 
10 years 
IRAQWMD I am going to read you a list 
possible threats to the vital 
interest of the United States in 
the next 10 years. For each one, 
please tell me if you see this as a 
critical threat, an important but 
not critical threat, or not an 




Q535/2 Favor or oppose the 
use of U.S. troops if 
Iraq invaded Saudi 
Arabia 
INVADE There has been some discussion 
about the circumstances that 
might justify using U.S. troops 
in other parts of the world. I’d 
like to ask your opinion about 
some situations. First, would you 
favor or oppose the use of U.S. 




Q540/2 Support U.S. troops to 
overthrow Saddam 
Hussein’s government 
OVERTHROW There has been some discussion 
about the circumstances that 
might justify using U.S. troops 
in other parts of the world. I’d 
like to ask your opinion about 
some situations. First, would you 
favor or oppose the use of U.S. 
troops in order to overthrow 
Saddam Hussein’s government 
in Iraq? 
Dichotomous 





























Generally speaking, do you think 
of yourself as a Republican, a 
Democrat, an independent, or 
what? 
Do you think of yourself as 
closer to the Republican Party or 
to the Democratic Party? 
 
How would you describe your 
political views: as very 
conservative, fairly conservative, 
middle of the road, fairly liberal, 











Q1001 Gender SEX Record Gender Categorical 
Q1080 Race RACE Do you consider yourself White, 
Black or African American, 
Asian or Pacific Islander, Native 
American or Alaskan native, or 




















Which of the following income 
categories best describes your 








     
 
